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1. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Recently there has been an upsurge of interest in New 
Zealand concerning insider trading in general, and its 
possible regulation in particular. The impetus for this 
has been the establishment of the Securities Commission,
1 
particularly its report on sharebuying activity in Bing 
Harris & Co. Ltd.,
2 increased judicial consideration as 
expressed in the celebrated case of Coleman v. Myers,
3 and 
increased public interest, particularly among large 
institutional investors as a result of the circumstances 
surrounding a number of recent take-overs.
4 Discussion 
of how insider trading should be regulated is particularly 
appropriate in view of the recent statement by the Chairman 
of the New Zealand Securities Commission that
5 
"[W]hen its programme permits, the Commission 
will undertake a review of the law and pract-
ice on the subject." 
This paper will first examine the reasons justifying 
the regulation of insider trading. During this discussion, 
some of the objectives of any potential regulation of 
insider trading will be established. Secondly, the current 
position in New Zealand will be examined in the light of 
these objectives. Thirdly, various other regulatory 
schemes will be examined to see whether they would better 
meet the objectives of regulation in New Zealand. Particular 
attention will be paid to the legislative alternatives which 
have been implemented in the United States, Canada, the 
United Kingdom and Australia, with a view to deciding whether 
similar legislation should be introduced in New Zealand. 
A paper of this nature cannot attempt to answer all the 
questions in an area as vast, vexed and complex as insider 
trading. It can at best provide an alternative viewpoint. 
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to provide a frame-
work for future discussion of insider trading regulation 
and to highlight some of the major issues involved. 
LAV/ l/~~.A')( 
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II RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In order to flesh out the objective framework, a 
series of in-depth interviews was carried out by the 
author. The people interviewed were prominent New 
Zealand businessmen.
6 An attempt was made to obtain 
a representative sample of executive directors, prof-
essional directors, representative directors, share-
brokers, insurance company general managers, investment 
company general managers, lawyers and Securities Commission 
members. The interview was semistructured and based 
on a loose series of questions covering the various topics 
raised in this paper. (See Appendix) 
The impressions gained from these interviews have 
been used to put some relative weighting on the regulatory 
objectives and to provide a body of opinion on the various 
regulatory alternatives. In this way it is hoped that the 
ideas generated by this paper are, to some degree, 
representative of those who are likely to be affected by 
insider trading regulation. 
, 
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III DEFINITION 
Inside information is information which is gained by 
reason of one's position or relationship with a company. 
It may or may not be of such a nature that, if released, 
it would have an effect on the market price of the company's 
securities ('price-sensitive'). In this paper it will 
be assumed that inside information is price-sensitive. 
Insider trading is usually defined to mean the use by 
corporate insiders and their associates of confidential 
price-sensitive information, not available to the investing 
public, which they have obtained by virtue of their position 
in the corporation, to make a profit or avoid a loss by 
dealing in the securities of the relevant company. 7 This 
is a very general definition, and further refinement is 
necessary. 
A. Who is a 'Corporate Insider' 
The circle of people whose relationship with the 
corporation marks them as a 'corporate insider' usually 
includes directors, senior corporate officers and major 
shareholders, in its narrowest sense, and may extend to 
include employees, professional advisors, third parties 
who are tipped off by an insider (commonly known as 
'tippees') among others. This definition of corporate 
insider is wide enough to include a major corporate 
shareholder who appoints 8 a director to the board of 
a company and who receives information about that 
company through the director. The position of such a 
director is the subject of some debate in New Zealand 
at present. 9 Two of the questions to be addressed by 
this paper will be whether a major shareholder (company 
or individual) who receives information from such a 
director should be regarded as an insider, and, if so, 
whether it should be treated any differently from other 
insiders. 
4. 
It is also possible that a person may be an 
insider in a corporation with which he does not have 
a contractual relationship. This -may occur when his 
corporation has some form of contractual or special 
relationship: for example the offeree to the offeror 
in a take-over situation. 
Just as there are various degrees of insider 
status in terms of the insider's position qua the 
company, there are various degrees of inside information. 
As a result of his position in the corporation, an 
insider will get a more informed view of the corporation's 
general prospects: for instance that the present 
management structural changes will improve the long 
term growth prospects. However, there will be times 
when he is in possession of a specific piece of 
information which is likely to have an immediate 
impact on the share price: for instance that the 
dividend is going to fall by five per cent this year. 
A further contrast. may be made between information which 
is uncertain or contingent, and that which is irmnediate 
and which may be termed a palpable reality. In most 
corporate decision-making processes there will be a 
natural progression from the uncertainty of the drawing 
board stage to the certainty of the directors' go-ahead 
to commence full production. 9A 
This lack of definition of what actually constitutes 
inside information is what makes insider trading such 
a grey area. However, it can be said that those insiders 
within the narrowest circle identified above, (i.e. 
directors and senior executives who are at the top of 
the corporate decision-making process), are more likely 
to come int_o possession of specific and certain inform-
ation which is price-sensitive. They are also more 
likely to be in a position where they can appreciate the 
value of the information because they have a superior 
corporate perspective. 
I . 
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As one moves out and broadens the circle of 
people termed insiders, it becomes less likely that 
they will come into possession of specific price-
sensitive information, and also, less likely that they 
will have sufficient perspective of the whole organis-
ation to be able to fit their piece into the overall 
'jigsaw puzzle' and make successful use of it. 
The term 'corporate insider' may, then, be seen 
as a series of concentric circles emanating from the 
corporation and based on the nature of a person's 
relationship with the corporation, and the specificity 
and certainty of the information that he has access to. 
B. When Does Insider Trading Occur 
It is useful to identify some of the different 
situations when insider trading may occur because the 
type of regulation appropriate may well depend on what 
type of insider trading is being dealt with. 
Insider trading may ocGur within a large, publicly-
listed company with a diverse shareholding at one 
extreme, or within a small, closely-held, family-type, 
private company at the other extreme. 
The method of transaction may range from an anonymous 
and impersonal stock exchange transaction to a face-to-
face dealing. In the case of the latter, the insider 
may actively approach the outsider, or he may be the 
passive receiver of an offer. 
This paper will focus on the publicly listed company, 
particularly where the dealing is on the stock exchange. 
Insiders in private companies do not have a ready market 
to buy and sell shares on. Therefore they are restricted 
to face-to-face de alings. If they wish to sell, most 
private companies' articles give a pre-emptiv~ right to 
6. 
buy to the other shareholders. These shareholders 
are likely to participate to some degree in the 
management of the business, and therefore are likely 
to have access to the same inside information. If 
not, the courts in their equitable jurisdiction are 
able to find a fiduciary relationship, based on notions 
f f .d d t b t h t· 
10 
o con i ence an rust, e ween t e par ies. 
Therefore, it may be said that,in general, different 
considerations apply to dealings in private companies' 
shares than to anonymous dealings in public company 
shares on the stockmarket. 
7. 
IV TOWARDS A POLICY BASIS FOR INSIDER TRADING REGULATION 
A. Policy Objectives of a Securities Market 
The formulation of a policy basis for the regulation 
of insider trading necessarily involves some consideration 
of the objectives of a securities market. It has been 
said that the securities market serves three functions: 
(a) it provides a ready market for securities; (b) it 
yields prices for securities that are in accordance with 
their investment value; (c) it acts as a medium for 
11 
channelling capital into economic development. 
If the securities market is going to provide for the 
ready marketability of securities, there must be as 
few impediments as possible. Thus the paper-work 
burden of reporting requirements must be minimised 
within the constraints of the other objectives. Secondly, 
if there is to be a ready market, there must be an element 
of trust in the other side. If there are persons in 
the market who are not subject to the vicissitudes of the 
market-place, then this trust breaks down. 
In its function of yielding prices for securities 
that are in accordance with their investment value, the 
securities market acts as a complex arrangement for the 
k . f . f . 
12 f II G M th mar et1ng o 1n ormat1on. Pro essor -.. anne, e 
chief proponent of this view, bases his view on 'the 
fundamental premise that information is a valuable 
good which will be sought after by human beings who 
13 
pref~r more rather than less of anything good'. 
The different amounts of profit that individual investors 
receive will reflect their different degrees of 
sophistication and the reliability of their information. 
The stock market is seen as 'par excellence, the arbiter 
of the value of the information•.
14 
The third function of a securities market is its 
i 
I' 
most important one. It acts as a medium for the 
allocation of capital resources into production. In 
terms of the economy as a whole, the objective of the 
securities market is to allocate capital to the highest 
return use possible. Thus a major objective of the 
regulation of a securities market is that it promotes 
efficiency. Efficiency refers to both the speed and 
the accuracy with which the market integrates new 
information into the market price of a security. 
The market price of a security may also be used 
as a measure of the performance record of management, 
and the potential profitability of a take-over. This 
th b . t f 1 h · · dlS was e su Jee o comment recent y w en it was sa1 
"The takeover is the one area where we have 
some salutary discipline in the commercial 
community. If the directors are ultimately 
inefficient to the point where their share 
pric.e exposes them to the designs and ambitions 
of those who think they can do better with the 
assets, then the directors- will lose their job." 
Thus, if the securities market is functioning effic-
iently both the capital and the 'corporate control' 
markets will function more effectively. 
There is another aspect to the function of the 
securities market as an allocator of resources. To be 
a successful medium between investors and producers, the 
securities market must attract investors. It has 
been truly said 'that the very preservation of any capital 
market depends on liquidity, which rests in turn on the 
investor's confidence that current quotations accurately 
reflect the objective value of his investment•.
16 
Since the price of a security is an indicator of what 
the buyer and the seller perceive as the true value of the 
B. 
security, it is essential that both . investors have 
confidence in that price. It is suggested that both 
parties are prepared to run the risk that the other side 
may have superior analytical ability. However, they 
would be much less willing to risk their capital if they 
thought that the other party was trading on information 
which they were legally barred from having, particularly 
if that information made the chance of a loss for them 
almost a dead certainty. 
Thus, to sustain investors' confidence, and hence 
their willingness to risk their capital by investing 
in the securities market rather than in, say, government 
stock, an objective of a securities market must be 
equality of bargaining power in terms of access to the 
same information. Therefore, two goals of securities 
market regulation must be to reward superior analysis 
of information, _ and to encourage maximum disclosure of 
information. In this way the twin objectives of efficiency 
and equality of bargaining power are met, and the 
continued flow of investor capital to areas of the economy 
having the highest marginal return is assured. 
Possible Areas of Impact of Insider Trading 
There are three general levels at which a corporate 
insider who trades on price-sensitive information may have 
an impact. First, perhaps at the most narrow and specific 
level; the insider trader may make a profit or avoid a 
loss at the other party's (outsider's) expense. For 
instance, if the information is good, then the outsider 
will sell at a lower price than he would have accepted had 
he been privy to the information. Similarly, if the 
information is bad, the outsider will pay too high a 
price, allowing the insider to avoid a loss. 
Secondly, the insider trader may have an impact on 
the corporation. Although a corporation is prevented 
. 
• 
. 
I 
•' 
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fromdealing in its own shares, 17 it is still possible 
to envis_age situations where insiders, privy to 
corporate information, may be in conflict with the 
corporation if they use it for personal advantage: 
for example, if the information is bad, but is of such 
a nature that it cannot be released by the corporation, 
and the insider uses it to sell his shares, thereby 
depressing the share price. (The share price will go 
down because the insider will be prepared to offer less 
than the share price). 
The corporation may also be affected if the insider 
is seen to be involved in opprobrious conduct. This 
may cause the prestige and goodwill of the corporation 
to be tarnished. It is true that the corporation has a 
great interest in maintaining an image of probity and a 
t t . f . . 18 h repu a ion or integrity. Top management must ave 
the respect and faith of their employees if they are to 
manage successfully. Public confidence in top management 
is necessary for the continued marketability of the 
corporation's securities. 
Thirdly, the insider trader may have an impact on the 
market as a whole. As has already been identified, the 
securities market serves a vital role in acting as a 
mechanism for channelling capital into economic development. 
The investor's decision to invest is determined by his 
perception of the riskiness of the market. He may be chary 
or even deterred from investing if he perceives that 
there are insiders who never get hurt and who are abusing 
the trust put in them by their employers. This is 
particularly true of the large institutional investor, 
or the foreign investor, who have a range of possible 
markets to invest their capital in. It may also deter 
some of the larger private companies from going public 
if unconscionable conduct by insiders is seen to occur~ 
Thus, it is important to bear in mind that there are 
these three levels of impact when possible regulation 
of insider trading is considered. For instance, in a 
given transaction it may be impossible to show damage 
at the narrow level to any individual investor, but it 
may be possible to show damage at one of the two broader 
levels. 
C. Should Insider Trading be Regulated - Morality and Reality 
The most common 'first blush' reaction to insider 
trading is that it is 'unfair'. It is said that whilst 
there are always uncertainties inherent in the buying 
and selling of securities, there should, as a matter of 
fairness, be an equality of bargaining power between 
outsider and insider. The insider should not have an 
advantage over the outsider for a reason that has no 
merit: namely superior access to corporate information 
as a result of their jobs. 19 It is considered unfair 
that by re~son of his superior access to information, 
the insider may cause the outsider loss, or deprive him 
of gain,. 
As well as being unfair, insider trading is often 
castigated as being immoral. It is said that the insider 
who receives information in his capacity as an officer 
of the corporation is bound to use it solely for the 
corporation's benefit. In the case of a director, he 
is appointed to represent the interests of all the share-
holders, not just himself or a few favoured friends. 20 
Therefore it is considered to be immoral if the insider 
uses the information for his own personal benefit. 
by 
He 
This approach to insider trading has been criticised 
Professor Manne as being self-righteous and hypocritical~l 
22 asserts 
"in the entire literature on insider 
trading there does not exist one careful 
analysis of the subject. Lawyers have been 
12. 
having a field day arguing about the 
meaning of words or the reach of the last 
case or any of a thousand technical and 
legal issues .... The tone of debate has 
remained essentially moralistic and -
question-begging. Logic has been totally 
lost to emotion". 
Manne is perhaps the best known opponent to the 
regulation of insider trading. He argues his case 
on the basis of logic an~ economic sense. 23 It is 
proposed to examine some of these 'logical criticisms' 
in the light of the objectives of the securities 
market that were established earlier, in order to 
determine whether insider trading does cause harm 
to other investors, the corporation or the market as 
a whole. 
1. The concept of 'confidence' 
Manne cites the celebrated American case of 
24 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Company as an example 
of the hypocrisy of the fairness/immorality arguments. 
In that case the directors of a mining company were 
able to buy shares in advance of the publication of a 
discovery of a rich vein of copper and zinc. They were 
held liable, along with the geologist, to account for 
th f . d h h . h 25 e pro its ma e. Manne exposes t e ypocrisy t us: 
" ... Texas Gulf Sulphur officials buying stock 
with knowledge of a new ore vein have somehow 
done something immoral, but the company itself 
buying surrounding land [to increase production 
capacity], utilising precisely the same inform-
ation, has merely performed in a business-like 
fashion" (emphasis added) 
To answer this criticism, it is necessary ~o 
examine the nature of information as a commodity, and 
the purposes to which it may be put. 
Information is an intangible asset. As such, 
its use for one pu~pose does not necessarily exclude 
its use for another purpose. In the case of a company, 
if an employee is given a physical asset such as a car, 
it is primarily given on the understanding that it will 
be used solely on company business. If the employer 
uses the car for his private business he is breaking 
a confidence, as well as diminishing (admittedly 
minutely) the value of the car. It is not so much 
the damage to itself that the company is worried about, 
but rather the breach of trust arising from the 
relationship between employer and employee. 
Applying these principles to company information, 
if an employee uses information gained through his 
employment to trade on the securities market, it is 
not so much the prospect of damage, but rather the 
breach of trust which labels the conduct as immoral. 
The insider was given access to the information on the 
understanding that it would be used for the corporat-
ion's business, not for some private purpose. 
Information may also be viewed in another light. 
Information may be regarded as property - an intangible 
asset of the corporation. 26 As an asset of the 
corporation it is to be used only by the corporation. 
Therefore its use should be restricted to corporation 
b~siness, unless, like any other asset, it is sold or 
leased out for valuable consideration. If an insider 
uses corporate information for personal gain on the 
securities market, he may be said to be misappropriat-
ing a corporate asset. The immediate result of 
regarding information as property is that one of the 
probative difficulties is overcome, for no matter how 
many times the information is passed on, it still 
'belongs' to the corporation. There is no need·to 
prove some confidential relationship between the 
parties. 
14. 
Returning to Manne's example, the difference 
lies in this: when the corporation uses the inside 
information to purchase land for a production facility, 
it is using its own information and therefore breaks 
no confidence; when the insider uses that information 
for personal gain he is breaking a confidence. That 
confidence may be based upon his relationship to the 
corporation, or it may be based on the information 
per se. It is the breaking of that confidence 
that is considered immoral. 
2. Equality of bargaining position - access v. analysis 
Secondly, Manne criticises the resort to equality 
of bargaining opportunity as a justification for 
regulating insider trading. The insider obviously 
has greater knowledge than the outsider because of his 
position, and thus has a superior bargaining position. 
Manne argues that one party will of necessity have 
more knowledge about the factors that will affect the 
share price than anothe~, 27 but both parties must 
be aware of this, and accept that risk. No amount of 
legislation could or should ensure equality of bar-
gaining position. 
Manne goes further, ·and describes the stock 
market as an information exchange in which a monetary 
1 • 1 d • f • 2 8 II • t va ue is pace on in ormat1on. In an 1nves ment 
market characterised by risk a high premium will 
normally be paid for reliable information'. The 
market rewards the best information, leading to 
allocative efficiency. 
To examine the validity of this argument it is 
necessary to bear in mind the reasons why one investor 
does better than another. The price that an investor 
is prepared to pay for a security is determined by his 
access to information, his comprehension, his evaluation 
and his ability to execute. Insiders have superior 
access to information, not because they are better at 
15. 
recognising and finding it, but because outsiders 
are lega1:1.Y prevented from having access to it. 
If the law is going to protect the right of corpor-
ations to prevent outsiders having access to such 
price-sensitive information (for legitimate reasons 
such as protection from competitive disadvantage), 
then it should as a matter of fairness prevent 
insiders from exploiting that information at the 
expense of others. It is submitted that investors 
are willing to accept the risk that others will have 
superior personal qualities in terms of comprehension, 
evaluation and even ability to execute. However, 
they are not willing to accept that some should make 
profits for reasons unrelated to personal qualities: 
namely, better access to information. 
A useful analogy may be drawn between investing 
in the securities market and betting on a horse race. 
The bettor accepts the risk that he may lose out to 
those with superior analytical skills who take the 
trouble to look at form and watch the horses in 
training. However, he would not accept the risk 
of lo_sing out to those who have inside knowledge that 
the race is 'rigged'. Manne seeks to distinguish 
b t . 1 . d . . d d. 
29 h e ween manipu ation an insi er tra ing. Te 
former he sees as 'having the race fixed', the latter 
a 'reliable tip on a winning horse.' Whilst it is 
accepted that there are various degrees of insider 
information ranging from general and uncertain to 
specific and certain,
30 there will often be times 
where the insider has more than a 'reliable tip' 
and 'having the race fixed' would be a closer 
analogy. 
Thus, the insider trader has a superior bargaining 
position for a reason that is unacceptable to the 
outsider investor. 
3. 
16. 
Impact of insider trading 
Thirdly, Manne asserts that the damage caused 
by insider trading is minimal, even non-existent. 
He begins by showing that only an extremely small 
proportion of shares are actively traded, and he 
asserts that insider trading forms only a very small 
proportion of market trading. 31 Therefore the evil 
attributable to insiders, in relation to the total 
h k t · 11 b 1. . bl 32 s aremar e , wi e neg 1g1 e. 
Manne distinguishes between those who trade in 
response to price changes and those who trade as a 
function of time. The latter would trade, even if 
they thought the price was going to change later. 
who trade on the stock exchange on the basis of price 
would trade at the going market price, whether it was 
from an insider or not. So would those in off-market 
transactions provided there were no misrepresentations 
or other inducements to trade. If they would have 
traded anyway at that price, it is difficult to see 
what loss they have made because of insider trading. 
Although the odds of trading with an insider may 
be small, someone must do. Thus the insider will 
increase the number of tr~nsactions taking place. 
This will mean that someone who would not have traded 
had the insider not been on the market, will now trade 
and suffer loss. Therefore it is not strictly 
correct to say that, in the case of stock exchange 
transactions, the outsider would have traded anyway. 
It can also be said that the activities of an 
insider will not always have a minimal effect on the 
market. In some situations,particularly in relation 
to an individual stock, insider trading may have a 
significant effect on the share price. This is likely, 
for example, when the insider is building up a signif-
icant minority interest based on inside information. 
Having established that insider trading is not 
always of negligible effect, it becomes important to 
assess whether it does damage other investors or the 
market as a whole. 
Manne asserts that insider trading is beneficial 
to other investors and to the market as a whole. 
If the information is good, suggesting favourable 
prospects, then the insider will be prepared to offer 
more than the market price. This means that all 
investors who sell to the insider before the information 
is publicly released will receive a higher price than 
. f th . . . d . h k 3 3 . . 1 1 1 ere is no insi er in t e mar et. Simi ar y, 
if the information contains bad news, then the price 
the outsider will pay will be less than he would have 
paid if there was no insider in the market. The 
insider will be prepared to accept a lower price. This 
reduces the average loss that the outsider will suffer 
when the inside information is released. Of course, 
by d~iving the market price up or down as the case 
may be, the insider is affecting the price paid in 
transactions. However, as in these transactions 
one 'innocent' person's gain is another 'innocent' 
person's loss, it is submitted that this has no bearing 
on the insider trading issue. 
Examining the 'insider transactions' more closely, 
some of them will involve outsiders who trade as a 
function of time, and others who trade as a function 
of price. In the case of the former, they will 
receive a higher price or pay a lower price. Thus 
they will benefit from insider trading. In the case 
of those who trade as a function of price, they may 
suffer a loss. This is because they would not have 
traded had the insider not created a pressure on price. 
rhey would have waited until the information was 
18. 
released to the market, and then would have benefitted 
from the resulting ·price change. These price-
sensitive investors tend to be short-term speculators 
who, it may be argued, are not bringing new information 
to the market. They are merely cashing in on other 
people's analyses. As such it is difficult to see 
why they should be the subject of protection for they 
tend to destabilise the market. 
4. Efficiency 
By moving the price of the security in the 
direction of its 'true' price, insider trading improves 
the efficiency of the market. This has been said 
to be beneficial on two levels.
34 First, on a 
societal level, it implies that the market uses all 
available information to allocate resources. Capital 
will flow to the most profitable investments wh~ch, 
in a market economy, are reflections of society's 
values. Secondly, on the level of the individual 
investor, efficiency implies that no one investor 
can systematically identify and acquire undervalued 
securities. 
There are a number of reasons why, at any 
particular time, information has not been publicly 
released. Some information will never be released 
voluntarily by the corporation. For instance, 
news of a personality clash within top-level management 
that may jeopardise the corporation's future may never 
reach the market place directly. Sometimes information 
will not be released even though its release would be 
in the p~blic interest. An example of this might be 
a scheme to defraud insurance companies by fabricating 
f 1 . 1 · . d . . th 
35 
a se insurance po 1c1es an re1nsur1ng em. 
Information reflecting the general 'feel' for a 
corporation which is built up as a result of years of 
experience may also never be released to the market. 
19. 
Some information's release date will be 
delayed. This may be because it is conjectural. 
For instance, a research and development team may 
estimate that the chances of a successful prototype 
to turn water into energy are 1:4. Another reason 
for delay might be that premature release may endanger 
a transaction which is still to be completed and thus 
prejudice the corporation. 
Thus it can be seen that there are a number of 
situations that will arise where information will not 
be generally available to the market, and where a 
'full disclosure' rule would not make it available. 
It may be that in these situations, the only way of 
'bringing the information into the marketplace' is by _ 
allowing the insider to trade on this information. 
It may be that this is the only way of maximising 
the efficiency of the market - in terms of both speed 
and accuracy. 
Therefore, it is suggested that in terms of 
direct impact on the market the only person who is 
damaged by the insider is the price-sensitive speculat-
or. In terms of overall market efficiency, everyone 
is better off. Perhaps the insider's profit is the 
price to be paid by the market for increased efficiency~ 6 
Whilst this may be an attractive argument, there 
are repercussions of insider trading other than 
efficiency to be considered which have an impact on the 
corporation and on the market as a whole. 
5. Importance of appearances 
Manne may be correct in asserting that in fact 
insider trading normally forms a minuscule proportion 
of total market activity but he neglects to consider 
the impact of appearances on the securities market. 
An investor's decision to invest is determined by 
his perception of the s~curities market as a whole, 
and of the stock of the corporation in particular. 
An investor will not invest in either if he does not 
have confidence in the integrity of them. 
Professor Loss has attacked insider trading on 
the basis that it37 
" ... constitutes an even more grievous insult 
to the market in the sense that the very 
preservation of any capital market depends on 
liquidity, which rests in turn on the investor's 
confidence that current quotations accurately 
reflect the objective value of his investment. 
The lawyer's adage that it is important for the 
courts to appear to do equity might well be 
borrowed by the economists with reference to 
the markets." 
There seems little doubt that if investors 
thought· there were some big fish in the market pond 
who were always going to be well fed, they would be 
det~rred from taking the plunge. 
It has already been established that the 
corporation has a very real interest in presenting an 
image of probity and integrity, both in terms of its 
management and its stock. 38 If insider trading 
is seen to occur, then the corporation will suffer 
real damage in that it will find it much harder to 
attract investment capital. 
If employees perceive that top level management 
is ma.king gains 'on the side' in addition to their 
formal remuneration, they will lose confidence in 
management. They may also feel that they are entitled 
to such 'extra'corporation benefits. Both of these 
may be harmful to the corporation. 
.J 
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Thus, even if it is conceded that the 
initial factual detriment of insider trading to 
the other party is small, perception of widespread 
insider trading could seriously damage both the 
corporation and the market as a whole. 
This raises two further questions: is insider 
trading really perceived to be a serious threat, and, 
if so, does it deter investors? 
It has been suggested that there are far more 
important psychological and economic factors than the 
possibility of insider trading that determine public 
f . d . th . . k 3 9 . t con i ence in e securities mar et. Many inves ors 
buy securities for the annual income stream they 
return. As they do not trade, short-term fluctuations 
in price do not affect them. Others, who are looking 
for a capital gain, tend to be short term speculators. 
They, it may be argued, ·do not provide a stable source 
of capital to corporations, and are thus unworthy of 
protection. 
It is also suggested that investors are less 
concerned with the integrity of corporate executives 
than with the marketability of the corporation's product. 
If a corporation shows promising prospects of growth, 
then the investor is hardly going to be deterred from 
investing by the possibility that an insider may 
be in the market. 
These are but a few preliminary considerations 
as to whether insider trading has a damaging effect. 
The question of whether insider trading actually 
constitutes a sufficient threat to warrant regulation 
will be discussed later. 40 However, it ·may be sa~d 
with confidence that there will be situations where 
disclosure of price-sensitive information cannot be 
compelled, so that the choice becomes one of insider 
trading or nothing, efficiency or inefficiency. 
6. 
2 2. 
Insider profits as a reward for the entreprenour 
Fourthly, and most controversially, Manne argues 
that insider trading is beneficial in that the use of 
inside information for personal gain is the one 
appropriate and adequate way of compensating the 
entrepreneur. It is said that the prospect of 
high uncertain profits is the only way of providing 
th . t . f . . . 1 . t 1 . 41 e 1ncen ive or innovation so essentia to cap1 a ism. 
Manne argues 42 
" ... even the most bureaucratically minded 
person may begin to have original ideas 
if the possibility of large rewards is 
apparent. 11 
He argues that salaries and bonuses are approp-
riate forms of compensation for the pure management 
function, but that entrepreneurs require something 
'much grander, though less certain 1 • 43 He draws 
the analogy with the _patent system which is designed 
to ,1) exclude the would-be interloper; (2) provide 
the patentee with a substantial reward for his idea, 
although that reward will vary with the economic 
' t- f th ' • I 4 4 th h impor ance o e invention. For e person w o 
has not founded his own business to exploit his idea, 
trading in the stock market on inside information 
provides a reward system. 
This aspect of Manne's thesis is the most contro-
versial.45 It is difficult to imagine that corpor-
ations consciously consider rewarding employees by 
allowing them to trade on inside information. There 
are a number of specific criticisms that can be made. 
First, the increased pace in the growth of new 
technology, coupled with the fact that corporations 
must innovate to survive, has meant that corporations 
have tended to manage innovation better, for example, 
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by paying people 'just to sit and think'. Thus, 
innovation, the mainspring of capitalism, is unlikely 
to dry up if insider trading is prevented. 
Secondly, the insider has already been remunerated 
for his innovation through his salary. Therefore 
he has done nothing extra which is beneficial to the 
corporation or the economy to justify his obtaining 
further compensation by using his superior bargaining 
position in the marketplace. 
Thirdly, even if it is conceded that the compen-
sation is not sufficient, there is no guarantee that 
the insider is going to be able to take advantage 
of his innovation because of his own financial 
constraints and his limited perception of the corpor-
ation as a whole. As many of the sample of business-
men interviewed by the present writer pointed out, 
there are other more certain and more effective ways 
of rewarding the insider: for example, by employee 
bonus share schemes. 
Fourthly, there are a number of situations that 
can be envisaged where the insider may be able to 
exploit inside information which are unrelated to any 
intrinsic merit on his part. For instance, where 
the information contains bad news, it is difficult 
to argue that the insider should be 'rewarded'. 
Even if the information is good, often its source will 
be extrinsic to the insider. For instance, fore-
knowledge that the dividend is to be increased is 
hardly capable of being described as an innovation, 
yet the insider may still be able to exploit that 
knowledge for personal gain on the securities' market. 46 
It is sometimes suggested that major shareholders 
who receive information through a 'nominee' director 
are entitled to trade on this information, on the basis 
that profits from such trading constitute a legitimate 
reward for the managerral expertise that they bring to 
th t . 47 h b . e corpora ion. Forte a ove reasons, it 
is suggested that their reward should lie in a 
management consultancy fee rather than in profits 
from insider trading on the securities market. 
7. Is a major shareholder who trades on information received 
through a 'nominee' director subject to different 
considerations 
To decide conclusively whether a shareholder who 
receives information through a nominee director is 
entitled to trade on that information, it is necessary 
to examine the status of the nominee director and the 
relationship of the shareholder with the corporation. 
A director enjoys a special relationship with the 
corporation akin to a trust relationship, which .is 
often termed 'fiduciary•. 48 As such he owes duties of 
loyalty and good faith to the corporation. 49 Unless 
the articles provide o~herwise, the director will owe 
th d . dl f h h b · d 51 ese uties regar ess o ow e came to e appointe . 
Therefore information which he receives comes under the 
same umbrella of confidence as it does to other directors. 
The case where a person is a director of two competing 
companies shows that this must be so - for otherwise 
information concerning the other's activities could be 
passed by the director from one board to the other with 
. . 52 irnp~nity. 
Now, in some situations it may be advantageous for 
information to be passed on to the major shareholder: 
for instance if the corporation is seeking more finance, 
or if the corporation is supplying technology. However, 
in these situations it is as if the corporation is 
dealing directly with the major shareholder, so that the 
same conditions of confidentiality apply as in any other 
business deal. The shareholding of the major share-
holder becomes an irrelevant factor. Therefore, trading 
by a major shareholder on information received through a 
'nominee' director should be regarded in the same way as 
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trading by any other third party on information 
received while dealing with the corporation. 
However, this view is not appropriate in all cases. 
Sometimes, where the shareholding is between twenty and 
fifty percent, and the equity participation is in the 
nature of a joint venture, it may be more appropriate 
to treat the shareholder as being on the board. Although 
the shareholder strictly does not owe the same fiduciary 
duties to the issuer as the directors, if it trades it 
should be subject to the same considerations as a director 
would be if he trades. Therefore, if an occasion 
arises when the board as a whole forbids the 'nominee' 
director from passing information on, and the director 
goes ahead and does so, the shareholder would be 
bound to treat it with the same degree of confidence as 
it treats other information. This is so, notwithstanding 
that the director is not qcting on behalf of the issuer 
and could be more accurately described as . being a tipper~
3 
For practical purposes it is convenient to regard the 
major shareholder as sitting on the board of the issuer. 
Two further points may be made concerning trading 
by major shareholders on information received through 
a representative or nominee director. It was argued 
by some of those interviewed that 'trading' on such 
information means buying and selling. Therefore it was 
argued that where the shareholder was only using the 
information to increase its shareholding, such as in a 
take-over situation, then that was not insider trading. 
It is submitted that this argument should be rejected. 
As has been seen above, the argument against insider 
trading is not based predominantly on the cqncept 
of profits and losses. It is based on the use of 
information to which a confidence attaches for private 
benefit. Clearly, in the situation discussed above, 
the major shareholder is buying more shares because it 
26. 
thinks that it will benefit. In conceptual terms 
there is little difference between an insider using 
information to make a gain by purchasing land, 
securities, or companies. The fact that the gain 
has not been immediately realised is beside the point. 
The profit has still been made. 54 
The second point to be made is that different 
considerations may attach where the shareholding by 
the major shareholder exceeds fifty percent. At this 
55 point, for equity accounting purposes at least, the 
company becomes a subsidiary of the major shareholder. 
As such a much wider range of financial data becomes 
available to the major shareholder, and the major share-
holder usually provides significant managerial, 
technical and logistical input. In such a situation, 
h · 1 . 1 . . t . 56 w i st in aw the two companies are separate enti ies, 
as a matter of practicality they are one. In such a 
case, the minority shareholders would expect there to be 
a free flow of information from one to the other, 
and, in the absence of fraud, it is unlikely that the 
courts would intervene. 57 
However, it is submitted that there is little diff-
erence in principle between a twenty and a fifty per 
cent shareholder. In both cases there will be likely to 
be significant benefits to both corporations in a free 
flow of information, especially where the major share-
holder provides managerial and technological input. 
It is perhaps this factor which distinguishes the 
investor from the trader. The investor, though he may 
wish to v~ry his shareholding on occasions, has a long 
term commitment to the recipient corporation, which 
benefits all shareholders. The trader does not. 
Therefore, in any regulation of insider trading, some 
allowance must be made for major shareholdings whi.ch 
are in the nature of a 'joint venture', to allow them 
on occasion, after full consultation with the board of 
.> the recipient corporation, to vary their shareholding 
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(principally to increase it). 
In principle then, it is suggested that where a 
major shareholder has built up a significant stake in 
a corporation and has reached the stage where it feels 
that it wishes to have a greater say in the running of 
the corporation by appointing a director, there is 
nothing wrong with that director passing information 
backwards and forwa~ds from one board to the other. 
This flow of information is beneficial to both 
corporations - it improves the performance of the 
rec±pient and thus increases the value of the share-
holder's investment. Two difficulties may arise 
however. One is where there is a conflict of interest. 
The other is when the shareholder wishes to change 
its shareholding. The first difficulty will be 
discussed later. 58 
With regard to the latter, on the basis of the 
requirements of efficiency, the shareholder must be 
able to change its shareholding. It cannot be 'locked 
in' in perpetuity. However, fairness requires that the 
shareholder should not be able to take advantage of 
information that it, by reason of its position, has 
access to 1 but which other investors and shareholders 
do not. Such an occasion would seem to demand a 
statement by the board of the recipient corporation, 
full disclosure by the major shareholder and trading 
at the going market price. Such would be a practical 
solution to a difficult problem. 
Therefore, in principle, a 'nominee' director 
should not be prevented from passing information on 
to the major shareholder provided it is beneficial 
to the recipient corporation (or at least not detri-
mental) and the shareholder is in the nature of an 
investor or partner rather than a trader. 
8. 
. _) 
Tippees 
28. 
A tippee is a person who receives price-sensitive 
inside information either from an insider or from 
another tippee. The question to be posed is whether 
the tippee should be permitted to trade on such 
information. 
For the purposes of analysis, it is suggested 
that tippees can obtain inside information in two types 
of circumstance: one is when the tippee knows that the 
communicator of the information is an insider who is 
breaking a confidence in passing the information on; 
the other is when the tippee does not know. In the 
case of the second type of tippee, it is suggested that 
he cannot be labelled unethical or immoral if he trades 
on the information, unless perhaps it can be shown that 
he ought reasonably to have suspected who the source 
was and was under an obligation to make further 
inquiries. In such a case, he would be considered 
to be part of the first category above. Tippees who 
do not know or suspect that their immediate source 
was an insider must be free to trade. They do not owe 
a fiduciary duty to any individual or issuer. They are 
often unable to differentiate between fact and opinion, 
between facts that can be substantiated and rumours that 
can not. Furthermore, they, by trading, are providing 
an important source of information for the market. 
By trading on rumours, which are more often than not 
correct, they are increasing the efficiency of the 
market. Finally, rumours always abound in the market. 
People who trade on them are not normally regarded as 
acting unfairly. It is an accepted risk of the 
marketplace. 
Moving on to consider the question of wheth~r 
tippees who receive price-sensitive information 
knowingly from an insider source are subject to different 
considerations to those of insider traders, it is at 
once apparent that tippees will in most cases have no 
) , 
relationship with the issuer either professionally 
or contractually. Therefore it becomes very difficult 
to establish the foundation on which to base a duty. 
The courts have consistently refused to admit that a 
t . f. d . d h . 59 It . 1ppee owes a 1 uc1ary uty tote issuer. is 
difficult to see how a tippee owes a duty to the issuer 
at all. The tippee breaks no confidence, and deprives 
the company of no opportunity. Therefore, even if it 
is accepted that the confidence attaches to the inform-
ation rather than the relationship, it is difficult to . 
see how the company is disadvantaged, or indeed how some 
duty to the company can be established. Perhaps one 
such method would be if the tippee with knowledge was 
regarded as being in the same shoes as the insider, so 
that if he traded, he would be subject to the same 
considerations as the insider would have if he had 
traded. Whilst this has some initial appeal, it raises 
problems where the tippee has received the information 
second- or third -hand, or where the information is 
received in a different form from that which the insider 
had access to. The argument that one is unfairly 
using information obtained through one's special 
position for profit loses strength where the tippee 
is many times removed from the insider. 
Perhaps the answer depends on what one takes to be 
the reference point when examining the problem. If 
one looks at it from the position of the tippee, it is 
difficult to imply anything more than that he was lucky to 
receive the information, the insider should not have been 
so silly or so careless as to give it to him, and that 
the remedy lies at the feet of the tipper rather than 
the tippee. This was the opinion of the majority of 
those surveyed, and for practical reasons more than 
any other, it is also the view of the prese~t writer. 
However, if one takes the reference point as being that 
of other investors in the market, then it may be 
possible to imply duty to the market. 60 Since these some 
.) 
other investors are still losing· out to a person 
utilising inside information, and the tippee knows 
that the information is supposed to be confidential, 
these investors would feel that trading py the tippee 
was improper, and would have the same effect of 
lessening business confidence in the integrity of the 
market as would trading on the information by an 
insider. This latter argument would appear to be _ 
more persuasive if there was some arrangement between 
the insider and the tippee involving mutual back-
scratching. However in this situation, the conduct 
would be improper from the position of the tippee also, 
because in such an arrangement he would be subject to 
condemnation as a tipper, nor as tippee. 
The question of whether tippees with knowledge 
should be subject to the same considerations as· insiders 
can probably not be answered conclusively in the abstract 
It is a question of balancing competing principles. In 
practice too, there is no unanimity of thought. Some 
would see tippees as being subject to the same conside r-
ations as insiders, for "to immunise such third parties 
from liability would encourage insider 'leaks' to 
outside friends 11 • 61 Others would see tippee inform-
ation in the same way as other market information which 
is not generally known - something that one can trade 
on if one is lucky enough to find it. In the end, 
it. must come down to balancing these competing views, 
and where the balance lies will depend on the degree of 
knowledge as to the source possessed by the tippee, and 
the strength of the relationship between the insider 
and the tippee. 
D. Conclusion 
Thus, insider trading, when examined in the light of 
the objectives of a securities market established earlier, 
appears to be generally detrimental - in theory, at least. 
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It breaks a confidence which is based either on the 
relationship between the insider and the corporation, or 
on the nature of the information as a property right per 
se. 
It gives the insider a superior bargaining position 
for a reason that has no merit. It rewards superior 
access to information rather than superior analytical 
ability. 
Though the damage caused to other investors in the 
securities market of a stock exchange transaction may 
be minimal and even unattributable to the insider, insider 
trading may cause damage to the reputation of both the 
corporation and the market. In this way it may undermin~ 
the flow of capital into the market in general and the 
stock of the insider in particular. 
Profits from insider trading do not appear to be a 
legitimate reward for enterpreneurial activity for the 
principal reason that when one enters a corporation one 
expects to be rewarded for one's endeavours by the corpor-
ation itself, not extrinsically by the securities market. 
Therefore, whilst Manne's ·thesis is attractively 
presented, it is suggested that it pays too little regard 
to the economic consequences of insider trading and extols 
a virtue which is non-existent. Perhaps the female law 
student had a healthier reaction to insider trading than 
her professor when she stamped her foot and declaimed 'I 
don't care; it's just not right. •62 
This not to say that insider trading in all the 
situations contemplated should be outlawed. It has b een 
seen that there are varying degrees of insider trading._ 
At the narrowest level, where the insider is trading on a 
specific piece of information, the simplest way of deterring 
the insider is by ensuring early disclosure of the inform-
ation to the market. This serves the dual purposes of 
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protecting the trust between corporation and insider, 
and ensuring that the market is functioning efficiently. 
However, situations can be envisaged where it is 
impossible for the regulators to compel early disclosure. 
There may be information which is not in the corporation's 
interests to release immediately, or it may be of such a 
nature that it will never be formally released. In such a 
case there is a clear conflict between the objectives of 
preserving confidentiality and maintaining market efficiency. 
At this point it becomes a question of balancing an 
intangible quality such as trust or integrity against a 
more tangible quality, namely market efficiency. It cannot 
be a question of simply banning insider trading. Quite 
apart from the impact on market efficiency that this would 
have, as the information becomes more vague and less certain, 
the strength of the corporation's proprietary interest in the 
information, or the strength of the confidence extended by 
the corporation, begins to wane. 
The strength of the confidence extended by the corpor-
ation may be weakened in other ways. As one moves further 
and further out from the control centre of the corporation, 
namely the board of directors, then the less one is likely 
to be held accountable to the coporation. A tippee is 
unlikely to be in a confidential relationship with the 
corporation. Neither is the office cleaner. Moreover, 
there is no clear dividing line between trading on an 
'insider fact' and trading on a 'shrewd piece of analysis'. 
These reasons suggest that as one moves away from the 
classical in~ider trading situation of a director trading 
on a specific and very price-sensitive piece of information, 
the importance of preserving a confidence as an objective 
declines relative to the objective of maintaining market 
efficiency. Therefore, a strong case may be made for 
allowing trading on information if the information can not 
be brought i~to the market in any other way. Perhaps it 
I 
is at this point that the economist holds sway over the 
lawyer, the realist over the legal theorist. 
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Thus, two watershed points have been identified as 
one widens the circle of investors marked by the term 
'corporate insider trader". The first is when no 
amount of regulation is going to produce more, or 
speedier, disclosure of information to the market. 
The second is when the requirement of market efficiency 
dictating that information be brought into the market so 
as to be reflected in securities prices, override the 
requirements of fairness and preservation of the confidence 
and integrity of management. 
These two watershed points should be borne in mind 
when the objectives of a securities market are being 
implemented. Those objectives are well stated in the 
following: 63 
"The ideal securities market should be a free 
and open market with the prices thereon based 
upon the fullest possible knowledge of all 
relevant facts among traders. Any factor 
whioh tends to destroy or put in question this 
concept lessens the confidence of the investing 
public_ in the market place and is, therefore, 
a matter of public concern." 
V PRESENT REGULATION IN NEW ZEALAND 
In analysing the extent of regulation of insider trading 
in New Zealand it is useful to have regard to the emphasis 
placed on the various methods available. Regulation is based 
on the twin mechanisms of disclosure and prohibition. These 
mechanisms may be applied by formal statutory controls such as 
a Securities Commission, or more informally by the use of 
professional-type bodies such as the Stock Exchange Association. 
A. The Legislature 
New Zealand is unique among its common law counterparts 
in that it does not have comprehensive, anti-insider trading 
64 legislation backed up by a statutory enforcement body. 
Under the Companies Act 1955, directors are bound to register 
the particulars of any shares they hold in a company, 
including the price of any transaction that they may from 
time to time make, and the register must be kept available 
for inspection. 65 This may act as a mild deterrent in that 
directors who put value in the esteem with which they are 
held by others would be reluctant to put themselves in a 
position where they may be asked to explain their large 
volume of trading by their fellow directors. However, this 
provision is· ineffective in that it only applies to directors, 
and that it is very easy to circumvent. For instance, it 
is relatively e~sy for a director to trade using a nominee 
to disguise his identity. 
Therefore, the legislature, if indeed it has a policy 
· t · ·d t d' 66 h 1 f h 1 t· f · agains 1ns1 er ra ing, as et t e regu a ion o 
insider trading to the courts, the Stock Exchange and other 
more informal bodies such as the Institute of Directors. 
B. The Courts 
1. The 'majority' rule 
The courts have upheld a general obligation of loyalty 
owed by employees to their corporation. However, they have 
drawn a strong line between the duty owed by directors and 
the duty owed by other employees. Directors are under a 
~iduciary obligation to act bona fide in the best interests 
f th t . a whole 67 t t t th 1 · o e corpora ion as o no pu emse ves in 
positions where their interests may conflict, to not make 
I t f . t I t f th • • • 6 8 d t • a secre pro i ou o eir position, an o exercise 
skill and care in carrying out their duties. 69 Employees, 
however, in the absence of a contractual covenant, are not 
under a fiduciary obligation to refrain from using inform-
ation which they receive as an employee for private 
advantage, provided they do not act to the detriment of the 
corporation. As such, because corporations can not purchase 
their own shares, employees would appear to be free at law 
to deal in their corporation's shares. 
A director will be liable as a fiduciary to account 
to the corporation for any pecuniary advantage he makes as 
a result .of his fiduciary position. 70 To be liable to 
account for profits, a fiduciary need not be in a position 
of conflict with his duty to the principal. 71 However, 
for the director to be held liable to hold the shares on 
trust for the corporation, it must be shown that he has 
deprived the corporation of its property, or of property 
that should have gone to it. 72 Since, as yet, a corpor-
73 ation cannot purchase its own shares in New Zealand, 
directors cannot be said to be depriving the corporation 
of property. Therefore, the director will be liable to 
account to the corporation for profitsonly. However, if 
he deals in other securities such as land, which the 
corporation may also have an interest in, he may be liable 
as a constructive trustee. 74 
The impact of the fiduciary duty as a sanction against 
insider trading is, however, somewhat limited. For instance 
it provides no sanction against a director who deals on 
·inside information to avoid a loss rather than to make a 
profit. A major practical problem with relying on the 
corporation to bring an action for recovery against the 
insider trader is that the persons in control of the 
corporation will often be the same persons as those doing 
the insider trading. This is not so much a problem in 
large public corporations where shareholdings are more 
diverse and the board of directors is likely to be composed 
of outside, professional people. In such a case, because 
all share transactions come under the scrutiny of the board, 
the corporation would appear to be in the best position 
to detect insider trading and to do something about it. 
However, in the case of closely-knit corporations where 
a major shareholder exercises strong control, particularly 
at board level, then the problem of corporate reluctance 
to bring an action for account remains. Alternatively, 
there seems nothing to stop the insider trader obtaining 
the company's consent to or ratification of his share deal-
ings.75 If this is done, in the absence of a constructive 
trusteeship there will be no liability to account for profits 
unless such consent or ratification can be shown to be a 
f d h 
. . . 76 
rau on t e minority. 
Reliance on the corporation for recovery of insider 
profits is unsatisfactory in other ways. It does not ade -
quately compensate the shareholder for the loss he has 
suffered. As the insider profits recovered a r e a n 
accretion to the funds of the corporation, each individual 
shareholder benefits indirectly in proportion to the 
number of shares he holds. However, a shareholder who sold 
to the insider will not benefit at all. Thus the majority 
rule is as not an effective or an equitable method of 
compensating shareholders who suffer loss at the hands of the 
insider. 
Where no specific loss may be suffered by an individual 
shareholder, such as in an anonymous stock exchange trans-
action, then recovery by the corporation may be most 
appropriate in that it benefits all the shareholders 
rateably. 
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The courts' ability to allow individual shareholders 
to bring an action against insider traders has been hampered 
by the much-maligned Chancery decision of Percival v. Wright: 7 
In that case, a director was approached by shareholders 
to purchase their shares at a quoted price. The director 
was aware of an impending takeover but did not disclose it 
to the shareholders. He accepted the shareholders' offer. 
It was argued that the defendants as directors were in a 
fiduciary position towards the plaintiff shareholders. On 
the facts of that case, it was argued that in negotiating 
the sale of the whole company, the directors had in law 
become trustees for the company and its shareholders, and 
could not purchase the interest of the ultimate beneficiary 
without Qaking a full disclosure. 
Swinfen Eady J. held that the directors were not 
under a duty to disclos e the negotiations for the sale 
of the company. His Honour based his decision on the 
principle of incorporation. Under this principle, a 
shareholder knows that the directors are responsible for 
'managing' the business of the company in the ordinary course 
of management, and impliedly releases them from any oblig-
ation to disclose any information so acquired. • 78 His 
Honour stated that under this principle, a share holder is 
with knowledge of all the directors' powers, and has no rrore 
to assume that they are not negotiating a sale of the unde r-
taking than to assume that they are not exercising any othe r 
power. Incorporation was held to not only affect the 
relations of the shareholders with the outside world, but 
also to affect their relations inter se. On this basis, 
Swinfen Eady J. held that the directors were not under a 
fiduciary obligation to the individual shareholders to 
disclose. 
"The contrary view would place dire ctors in a 
most invidious position, as they could not buy 
or sell shares without disclosing negotiations, 
a premature disclosure of which might well be 
against the best interests of the company. 1179 
However, perhaps most importantly, his Honour 
went on to say 
"There is no question of unfair dealing 
in this case. The directors did not 
approach the shareholders with the view of 
obtaining their shares. The shareholders 
approached the directors, and named the price 
at which they we:rre desirous of selling ... so 
(emphasis added). 
This last part of Swinfen Eady J. 's judgment is 
important because it is commonly said that Percival _v. 
Wright stands for the proposition that a director does not 
stand in a fiduciary relationship with individual share-
holders, and consequently individual shareholders do not 
have standing to sue if the director uses inside information 
to trade in the corporation's shares.
81 However, as 
already pointed out, there was no question of unfair dealing, 
because the shareholders appr9ached the directors. There 
was no unjust enrichment, because the negotiations for the 
takeover were abortive. This, it is submitted, is not to 
say that in nu circumstances will a director owe a duty 
to individual shareholders. 
2. Exceptions to the rule 
There are at least two cases where the courts have 
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held that there was a duty. In Allen v. Hyatt, it was 
held that when directors purport to be acting on behalf of 
individual shareholders, an agency is formed and the 
directors became accountable to the shareholders qua agents, 
not qua directors. Viscount Haldane who delivered the 
opinion of the board said8
3 
"The appellants appeared to have been under 
the impression that the directors of a company 
were entitled in all circumstances to act as 
though they owed no duty to individua~ share-. 
holders. No doubt the duty of the directors 
was primarily one to the company itself. It 
might be that in circumstances such as those in 
Percival v. Wright they could deal at arm's 
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length with a shareholder. But the 
facts in the present case were widely 
different from those in Percival v. Wright, 
and their Lordships thought that the directors 
must here be taken to have held themselves out 
to the individual shareholders as acting for 
them on the same footing as they were acting 
for the company itself, that was as agents ... ". 
(emphasis added). 
Implicit in this passage are at least two propositions. 
First, that although a director may owe a duty primarily to 
the company, he may also owe a duty to individual share-
holders. Secondly, although there may be circumstances 
such as those in Percival where a director may deal at arm's 
length with a shareholder, there will be circumstances where 
he may not. Examples of such circumstances may be when the 
director approaches the shareholders, or when the director 
could release the information if he wished to, because its 
release would do no harm to the company, but instead he 
' 
trades on it. 
The second case, which provides another example of an 
instance where a director may owe a fiduciary duty to 
individual sha~eholders, and which lends furth e r weight 
to the proposition that the decision in Percival v. Wright 
must be confined very much to its facts, is the New Zealand 
decision of Coleman v. Myers. 84 Once again, the facts are 
important in terms of the decision reached. 85 
The case involved an offer by two minority shareholders, 
who were also managing director and chairman, of an old, 
established family firm, for the remainder of the shares in 
the company. The offer was made by another company which 
the two shareholders held all the shares in. Most of the 
shares in the family company were held by relatives or family 
trusts. The offerers failed to disclose that the marke t 
value of the assets of the company was much in excess of the 
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valuation given them by their share offer. The offerors 
were aware of this because of their positions on the board 
of the family company. The offer was accepted. Subsequently 
the offerors sold off some of the assets of the company 
(principally land) to pay for the shares. When they learned 
of this, some of the offerees brought an action claiming 
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence. 
Mahon J., after a discussion of Percival v. Wright 
and the developments since, said86 
" ... I reach the unhesitating conclusion that 
the decision in Percival v. Wright, directly 
opposed as it is to prevailing notions of 
correct commercial practice, and being in my 
view wrongly decided, ought no longer to be 
followed in an impeached transaction where a 
director dealt with identified shareholders." 
" .•. The essential basis of breach of fiduciary 
duty is the improper advantage taken by the 
defendant of a confidence reposed in him either 
by, or for the benefit of . the plaintiff. When 
'one considers the lega~ relationship between the 
shareholder in a limited liability company and the 
directors entrusted with the management of the 
company, it appears to me that in any transaction 
involving a sale of shares between director . 
and shareholder, the director is the repository 
of confidence and trust necessarily vested in him 
by the shareholder, or by his legal status, in 
relation to the existence of information affecting 
the true value of those shares. 1187 (emphasis added). 
Woodhouse J. in the Court of Appeal qualified this by 
holding that the standard of conduct required will differ: 88 
" ... depending upon all the surrounding 
circumstances and the nature of the 
responsibility which in a real and practical 
sense the director has assumed towards the share 
holder." 
Mahon J~ seems to contemplate a fiduciary duty 
occurring only when the director is dealing with identified 
shareholders. This would seem to exclude stock exchange 
transactions. -In view of Woodhouse J. 's comments on 
appeal (Cooke J. make similar comments) 89 it would seem 
that a director will only o~e a fiduciary duty to individual 
shareholders when he is in a 'special ' relationship. Whether 
such a 'special ' relationship occurs will depend on the 
facts. However, it seems ·clear that the Court of Appeal 
did not contemplate a general duty on the part of directors 
to refrain from deriving a personal advantage from their 
d ealing with other shareholders . 
In summary then, the courts appear willing to allow 
corporations to recover from insider traders , but unwilling 
to allow individual shareholders to recover . This stems 
from their support of the notion that the company is a 
separate legal entity which employs directors and to which 
the directors owe a fiduciary duty. ·The legal fiction 
that a company is distinct from its incorporators is extended 
so as to exclude a duty on the part of directors (or other 
insiders ) to the individual shareholders. Swinfen Eady J . 
used a version of this rule when he r efused to recognise a 
duty by directors to shareholders on the basis that share-
holders must be taken to know that when a director is given 
responsibility for management he will come i11to possession 
of price-sensitive information which , if rele~sed , may be 
detrimental to the company as a whole (the ' internal 
management' rule). As a director's first duty is to the 
company as a whole , the shareholder would not expect him 
to release such price-sensitive informat ion. This pre-
occupation with the concept of the company as a separate 
legal personality prevents the courts playing a leading role 
in the regulation of insider trading. This is especially 
so where the trading takes place on the stock exchange, or 
when the insider trader is not a director , or when the 
person who deals with the insider is not a shareholder at 
the time of the transaction . 
c. 
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Self-Regulation 
Probably the strongest and most effective method of 
regulating insider trading in New Zealand at present 
is the self-regulatory method. This comes in semiformal 
form in the practice guidelines and listing requirements 
of the Stock Exchange Association,
90 and in less formal 
form in the surveillance by boards of directors of share 
transactions in their respective companies. 
1. Self-regulation:·directors 
The Stock Exchange Association is the primary 
regulatory body in the stock market in New Zealand. 
Its ambit of control is limited to publicly-listed 
companies. It seeks to promote full disclosure 
of information by companies through its listing 
. . . d 91 requirements. One requirement provi es 
"501. The company has agreed to supply 
promptly to the Exchange all relevant 
information (within the Company's knowledge 
and power to release) so as to ensure that 
the market is at all times properly informed." 
Thus there is a general duty on the company to 
ensure that the market is kept informed. 
In addition, companies must provide the Stock 
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Exchange with yearly and half-yearly accounts which 
provide more detailed financial data. 
Similarly, under the Takeover Code, 
"604. No material inforr.1ation is to be 
withheld by either offerer or offeree and 
all material information made available to 
any one shareholder in his capacity as share-
holder, is to be made a ailable to all. In 
the case of a listed company, the Exchange is 
also to be advised. 
43. 
605. A false or uninformed market must 
not be allowed to develop by the offeror 
or offeree company in the shares of either. 
The Exchange must be notified of any talks 
or negotiations involving a listed company 
immediately it can reasonably be inferred 
that an offer may result." 
In addition, directors are probibited from passing 
on price-sensitive information to third parties: 
"603. Directors are not to pass to 'third 
parties information that, if acted upon, 
might enable such third parties or others 
to deal in the mark.et to their advantage. " 
Directors are prohibited from trading in the 
shares of the offerer or offeree companies until the 
market has been informed of the offer. When they do 
trade , they must inform the Stock Exchange that they 
have traded, and must state the details of volume and 
. 93 price. 
These requirements do not appear in the majn body 
of the Manual relating to ordinary announcements . 
Therefore there is no express control of directors ' 
dealings in situations other than the take-over situation 
The listing requirements, other than in the take-over 
situation, only regulate insider trading by means of the 
disclosure mechanism. 
If a company fails to comply with the listing 
requirements there is provision fpr trading in the 
company's share~ to be suspended pending a full inqui ry , 
or even, in an extreme case, for the company to be 
delisted. 
• 
Whilst there is provision for disclosure and the 
possibility of sanction, it is unclear exactly what is 
contemplated by 'false or uninformed market' and 
' material information'. Paragraphs 501 to 512 cover 
price-sensitive items such as dividends, profit 
announcements, half-yearly reports, offers for shares 
and the like. Paragraph 513 provides that the 
Executive Director may be consulted on a confidential 
basis, but this is only helpful when the company is 
willing to disclose information in the first place. 
It is suggested that only in the most blatant of cases, 
where the information is very price-sensitive, will the 
breach be detected and corrective action be taken . 
However, that is not to say that the Listing Manual 
provisions are ineffective. The threat of some action 
being taken by the Stock Exchange would normally be 
enough for a director, mindful of the best interests of 
the shareholders, to take action to ensure that 
continued trading in the shares of t0e company is not 
endangered. It might be argued that on this basis, 
directors will disclose more rather than less, to be on 
the safe side. However, given the present, what many 
would consider to be woeful, lack of disclosure of 
information by public companies in New Zealand, it is 
difficult to find support for this hypothesis in 
practice. 
Where perhaps the Stock Exchange Association is 
becoming more successful is in the release of more 
general financial information in the Annual Reports. 
For instance, from 1983 onwards, accounts calculated 
according to Current Cost Accounting principles must 
accompany the ordinary accounts. In this way, a 
greater body of information is made available, and the 
opportunities for insider trading are reduced. 
In · an effort to establish proper standards of 
conduct and to discourage insider trading, the Stock 
• 
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Exchange Association has issued "Stock Exchange 
Guidelines for Securities Transactions by Directors 
of Companies 11 • 94 These Guidelines were prepared 
with the informal assistance of the Institute of 
Directors. They establish a series of basic 
principles of good practice and then set out some 
model rules based on these principles. 
In brief, the principles are as follows: 
(1) directors should not deal in their companies' 
securities on considerations of a short-term 
nature 
(2) directors must accept that they are not free at 
all times to deal in their companies' securities 
( 3) directors should accordingly not deal immediately 
prior to regularly iecurrin~ information (eg 
profit) announcements. Nor should they deal 
prior to announcemen~s of an exceptional nature 
which may affect the market price 
(4) what constitutes an eceptional announcement 
involves an element of judgment, but examples are 
those contained in paragraphs 501-503 of the 
Listing Manual. 
(5) the prohibited period prior to an exceptional 
announcement should start from the point at 
which the likelihood of an announcement ultimately 
being n e cessary becomes a reasonable possibility . 
In brief, the rules are as follows: 
(1) A director who receives inside information 
by virtue of his position, should not use that 
information to deal in his or any other company's 
securities. 
(2) A director may otherwise feel free to deal if he 
a) notifies the chairman of the board and receives 
acknowledgement 
b) obtains a written record of the above 
c) does not trade within two months of company 
results announcements unless in exceptional 
,, 
, 
circumstances such as a pressing financial 
commitment. 
d ) in the case of a take-over offer, waits until 
the market has been informed of the offer . 
(3) A register of directors dealings should be 
maintained, and available for inspection . 
(4) The directors should ensure that employees also 
deal in accordance with the guidelines. 
These guidelines are a useful statement of what 
constitutes good conduct. They do not, however, 
seem to cover the case of tippee trading. Nor do they 
seem to cover the case where a representative director 
passes information on to a major shareholder and the 
latter uses the information to trade. 
As they are recommendatory in nature only, the 
guidelines lack any formal sanction. They are more 
a statement of what is thought to be proper conduct, 
possibly increasing the pre-existing unwritten standard. 
By putting the standard into writing , the guidelines 
aim to increase the general standard of conduct. A 
further aim is that the guidelines will be used by 
directors in formulating an~ interpre ting their own 
95 company codes. 
The guidelines set out a business ethic. Business 
ethics provide a powerful check on the behaviour of 
most professional people. As many directors are 
professional people , notably lawyers and accountants , 
many of the standards they are subject to in their own 
professions are brought over inLo their directorships. 
As such , the standard of ethical behaviour expected by 
directors of themselves and of others is very high. 
As one of the interviewees remarked , 
"The standard ,,:hich I ..,.;ould apply in my 
personal affairs may be ~igher than I would 
require of others" . 
• 
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The writer was impressed with the general standard 
of conduct which the interviewees observed in their 
everyday affairs. Most felt bound to purchase 'a 
sizeable parcel' and to 'stick by it'. Clearly, 
'wheeling and dealing' was very much frowned on, as 
was a 'loose tongue'. It was the general concensus 
of opinion that many directors were concerned to be 
seen to 'do the right thing'. 
The presence of written guidelines could be seen 
to have an effect in two ways. First, some 'law-
abiding' individuals will respect the guidelines. Other~ 
will be influenced by these people and will follow their 
lead. Secondly, some will be deterred from breaching 
guidelines by fear that others will disapprove. In 
this way, the vast majority of directors of public 
corporations are effectively kept in line. 
One final check is that a register of all 
directors shareholdings and dealings must be kept 
by the company and available for public inspection.
96 
Directors' shareholdings must now be published in the 
annual reports. 97 Thus, unless the director trades 
under a nominee, he will be the subject of scrutiny 
by his fellow directors and the shareholders. 
Regulation of employees 
As regards trading by other insiders such as 
employees, there are two major constraints. The most 
obvious is that lower level employees are not going to 
have the same degree of access to price-sensitive 
information as directors. Nor are they likely to have 
a complete picture of the corporation to enable them 
to see the price effect of their snippet of information. 
Secondly, the directors exercise a real degree of 
control. Unless an employee trades in the name of a 
nominee, his name will appear on the share register 
• 
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which is the subject of regular inspection by 
any conscientious board. Therefore any short-term 
trad ing can be detected and the employee summoned to 
explain. At least three of those interviewed 
expressly stated that if they discovered that any 
of their employees had indulged~~ insider trading, 
they would dismiss them forthwith. 
In the case of employees of accountancy firms 
who may be privy to information contained in the accounts 
of a company they audit, they are often required to 
sign a secrecy agreement. Therefore, if they breach 
this agreement by insider trading, they are also liable 
to instant dismissal and may be liable to damages 
for breach of contract. 
Therefore employees are discouraged from insider_ 
trading by the prospect of dismissal from their jobs. 
The directors or senior management act as an enforcement 
body. 
3. Other factors - smallness of market 
The size of the New Zealand share market is very 
small in relation to markets overseas. The market is 
also compact. This means that there is much greater 
awareness about what everyone is doing than there is in 
the United States where there are thousands of listed 
companies and thousands of miles between markets. 
The New Zealand corporate sc~ne is characterised by 
interlocking directorships. This makes it very 
difficult for the insider to trade undetected, or to 
trade without a question-mark hanging over his motive 
for transacting. This closeness, combined with the 
high ethical standard expected as.outlined above, acts 
as a powerful, informal, regulatory tool. 
• 
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D. The Position of Shareholders who receive Information 
through a ~epresentative' Director - are they regulated? 
There is no legislative control of nominee or 
representative directors other than the sparse requirements 
of registration of directors' shar .holdings outlined earlier 
and the remedies provided in the case of oppression of 
. . t. 98 minori ies. 
There is however, a little more judicial control. 
Lord Denning in Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society 
v. Meyer 99 stated that where a person was a director of 
two companies, and found himself in a position of conflict, 
he would be failing in his duty to one if he subordinated 
its interests to those of the other. The reJ.evant 
facts were that three directors (out of twelve) of the co-
operative society were also directors of a textile company 
which the society held a majority of the issued shares of. 
The textile company had five directors in total, of which 
three were appointed under the art£cles as 'nominees ' 
of the society. 
d . . dlOO Lor Denning sa1: 
"So long as the interests of all concerned 
were in harmony, there was no difficulty. The 
nominee directors could do their duty to both 
compan ies without embarrassment. But, so soon 
as the interests of the two companies were in 
conflict, the nominee directors were placed in 
an impossible position . It is plain that, in 
the circumstances, these three gentlemen could 
not do their duty by both companies, and they 
did not do so . 
... They probably thought that 'as nominees' 
of the co-operative society their first duty 
was to the co-operative society. In this they 
were wrong. By subordinating the interests 
of the textile company to those of the co-
operative society, they conducted the aff~irs 
of the textile company in a manner oppressive 
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to the other shareholders." 
These are clear dicta that although it is possible 
to be a director on two boards, acting as a nominee on one, 
the director must ensure that in the case cf a conflict 
situation arising, he separates his duties to the respective 
companies, and does not subordinate one to the other. 
Lord Denning sees the director in the conflict situation 
to be in an 'impossible' position. Therefore it may well 
be that a director, when faced with a conflict situation, 
must either resign from one board, or deprive himself of 
access to all information which may be detrimental to one 
company if it is released to the other. If he chooses to 
continue to play a full part in the affairs of both 
companies, he must be very careful to separate their affairs. 
The extent of the 'conflict' situation as envisaged 
by Lord Denning is unclear. Obviously it would cover the 
case where the two companies are competing: for example 
a takeover situation. However, a conflict may be thought 
to arise where the director of the 'subsidiary ' company 
learns of bad news. If he passes this information on to 
the principal company, the latter may be encouraged to sell 
out, or lessen its commitment. It is submitted that this 
is not a 'conflict' situation. If the principal company 
does trade ou the bad information, it is subject to the same 
regime as any other insider trader. But the assumption was 
made earlier that the principal company was not using the 
information it received through a nominee director to trade. 
Rather, it was being used to assist both companies. 
Lord Denning suggests that in the case before him the 
'nominee' directors of the society were acting in a 'manner 
oppressive to the other shareholders'. As such, the 
other minority shareholders may apply to the court for rel-
ief.101 If it appears 'just and equitable ' to do so, the 
court may make an order regulating the conduct of the 
company's affairs in future, directing the company to 
institute or discontinue court proceedings and restricting 
• 
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or forbidding the carrying out of any proposed act.
102 
In extreme cases where the directors have acted in 
their own interests, rather than in the interests of the 
company as a whole, in a manner that appears to the court 
to be unfair or unjust to any member of the company, the 
103 company may be wound up by the court. 
The dictum quoted above of Lord Denning - "so long 
as the interests of all concerned were in harmony, therewas 
no difficulty" - suggests that his Lordship contemplated 
a close relationship between the company and the major 
shareholder, with information passing from one to the other. 
However, his Lordship was contemplating a case which is not 
typical in two respects. First, the 'nominee' directors 
were appointed pursuant to a provision in the articles, which 
specifically contemplated 'nominee' directors. Usually there 
is no such provision, and the major shareholder merely 
exercises its numerical voting strength in a general meeting 
to appoint its 'nominee' directors. Opinions differ as to 
whether such a 'nominee' director is under differentobligat-
ions· to thos~ · of a 'nominee' director appointed pursuant to 
the articles. 104 It is said that in the absence of specific 
provision in the articles, a director appointed by a major 
shareholder owes the same duties as any other director. 
The present writer agrees with this. However it does not 
follow that in passing on information to a major shareholder, 
a 'nominee' director is breaching his duty to the company. 
Provided the giving of such information is beneficial to the 
company, it is submitted that the director is acting in 
accordance with his duty. It is submitted that the 
alternative proposition that information should not be passed 
on would have the unfortunate result of making a distinction 
between a human being who is a major shareholder, who could 
become a director and be privy to information, and a company 
who is a major shareholder, who cannot become a director 
except through one of its officers, and who could not be privy 
to information. Where the nominee director is the managing 
director of the major shareholder the distinction becomes 
, 
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unworkable. It is suggested that having a provision 
in the articles stating that certain directors are 
'nominee' directors merely makes explicit what was 
implicit, namely that information is expected to be 
passed backwards and forwards between the boards of the 
recipient company and the major shareholder. It is noted 
that the opportunity always exists for the board of the 
recipient company to put a restrictive caveat on any 
information it does not want passed on, or alternatively, 
the director may be asked to leave the room. 105 
Secondly, the Scottish Co-op case is different in that 
the society had a majority of the issued shares. Typically, 
in New Zealand, the stake may be as low as twenty per cent, 
yet the shareholder may have sufficient control to appoint 
a director. It is sometimes said that there is a difference 
in principle between such a shareholder and one who has 
over fifty per cent. This is on the basis that when a 
shareholding reaches fifty per cent, the company becomes a 
subsidiary, and thus becomes subject to different consider-
ations. For instance, financial data must become available 
for equity accounting purposes. However, it is submitted 
that in principle there is no difference. In law, the two 
. · 11 d d . t · 106 d companies are sti regar e as separate enti ies, an 
the minority shareholders are still entitled to freedom from 
oppression. These rights are the same whether the major 
shareholder in control is in a minority or a majority 
position. Furthermore, the directors still owe a fiduciary 
duty to the company to act bona fide in its best interests, 
whatever the shareholding of the major shareholder. In 
practice, the minor shareholders will normally have the 
choice of accepting that the major shareholders will have 
a major influence on the company's policy, or selling their 
shares and getting out. 
Since there is a divergence of opinion as to what 
constitutes proper commercial practice in regard to the 
p~~sing on of information by nominee directors, the informal 
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controls which apply to insider trading are not as 
strong in this field. There is also some ambiguity 
as to the distinction between someone who 'buys and 
sells' on inside information and someone who just 'buys'. 
It would be fair to say that the majority would feel that 
shareholders who receive information through a 'nominee' 
director should not trade except in exceptional circum-
stances; but this does not act as much of a sanction. 
E. Effectiveness of Present Regulation of Insider Trading 
in New Zealand 
The dual regulatory mechanisms of the courts, and 
ethical standards,act in a complementary manner. The courts 
will act to prevent insiders (principally directors) 
abusing their position by trading on inside information, 
if it can be shown that there was a 
relationship between the parties. 
in a face to face dealing. Thus it 
special, confidential 
This will only occur 
would be likely to 
occur only in smaller private companies. Alternatively, 
where the director acts in a manner oppressive to minority 
shareholders, the court may give relief under the power 
given in the Companies Act 1955. 
On the other hand, in the case of larger, public 
companies where transactions are carried out through inter-
mediaries on the stock exchange, the dual controls relied 
on are those of business and professional ethics playing 
on those at the top, and those at the top in turn controlling 
those below. 
Perhaps the strength of this 'ethical' control lies 
in the fact that it is not too specific, and until recently, 
largely unwritten. Since concern with reputation is such 
a strong motivating factor in professional life, seeking 
to 'do the right thing' produces conservative conduct among 
the vast majority of directors. 
·There are gaps however, in the present regulatory 
set-up. First, as can be seen from the attitude of the 
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Court of Appeal in Coleman v. Myers,
107 the courts will 
not find a fiduciary duty to individual shareholders based 
solely on the relationship of director and shareholder. 
What constitutes the something extra to make the relation-
ship fiduciary is unclear. Secondly, although the courts 
have upheld a fiduciary duty between the director and the 
company, and have therefore held that a director may not make 
a secret profit out of his position, the problem remains 
of getting the company to bring an action. This is 
especially so where the director is also a controlling 
shareholder. The situation has been helped somewhat by 
recent statutory changes which allow a shareholder to apply 
to the court to make an ord~r directing the company to 
. t't d' 108 ins 1 ute procee ings. 
Thirdly, the general problem remains of detection 
of insider trading, especially in non-listed companies. 
It may be argued, in the case of face to face dealing$, 
such as usually occur in a private company, that the . 
other party must know that the insider is going to be in 
possession of more information, possibly of a price-sensitive 
nature and takes that risk when he trades with the insider. 
He always has the option to request disclosure. If the 
director misrepresents the position, then the courts are 
likely to find the special relationship requirement is 
fulfilled. Otherwise it is a case of caveat emptor 
just as if the insider was selling a motor vehicle. 
In the case of stock market transactions, the problem 
of detection is exacerbated by the availability of nominees 
which allowsinsiders to trade anonymously. The problem 
of nominees is one that arises in relation to the whole 
market, not just in the area of insider trading. Therefore 
its remedy li~s in wider considerations than the 
regulation of insider trading~OBA If the nominee problem 
is eliminated then detection of insider trading does not 
present such a difficult problem. Turnover in shares is 
relatively low in New Zealand. This enables directors to 
keep a check on who is buying or selling. The directors' 
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share register provides a further check. If directors 
are worried about their reputation they are likely to be 
deterred from placing themselves in a position where they 
may be required by the board to explain their motives for 
trading. 
Fourthly, whilst there is no doubt that the situation 
is improving, there is still a general lack of disclosure 
of information by companies in New Zealand. This is 
particularly so with respect to information which is of a 
one-off rather than ongoing nature. The market seems not 
to respect frank discussion. Therefore when a company is 
·doing well its performance is underplayed in the company 
report and when it is doing badly its performance is over-
played. There is no immediate remedy to this problem. 
Investors must resort to market analysts to obtain a 
true picture. Thus, the present regulatory set-up has 
deficiencies in terms of encouraging a full, fast and frank 
disclosure of information to the market. In this way it is 
not meeting the ~equirements of efficiency and equity. 
Fifthly, whilst the informal sanctions of business and 
professional ethics work very well in the majority of cases, 
in a small number of cases, particularly in the 'nominee' 
director field where the requisite standard of conduct 
is not settled, these sanctions break down. As the 
sanctions are informal, there is little that can be done 
to deter a person who is willing to incur the wrath of his 
colleagues and who has a sufficient power base to withstand 
any putdowns that may come his way; for example refusal by 
others to appoint as a director in other companies. 
There is also very little regulation of insiders 
within the wider circle of insiders such as junior officers 
and tippees. The example of accountancy firm employees 
who must sign secrecy agreements was cited to show how some 
of these insiders are controlled. But as a practical 
matter, even if the board discovers active trading by an 
employee and suspects that use has been made of inside 
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information, it would be very difficult to prove that the 
employee actually used the information. A possible 
check on these types of insiders is that they will not 
be privy to the whole picture and thus are often as not 
likely to get it wrong and lose money by trading. 
Tippee trading, it seems, goes unchecked by law,
109 
or by ethics. Most of those interviewed did not recognise 
any duty not to trade on tippee information. The remedy 
was seen as lying against the tipper - the director - for 
disclosing information which he should not have. This 
suggests that it is not wrongful for a tippee to make a 
profit by trading on information which is price-sensitive 
and not generally available. The tippee has abused no 
position of trust. However, his conduct is wrongful under 
the broader rationale that persons with special knowledge 
derived from a privileged position should not be able to use 
that knowledge to the direct detriment of members of the 
general public. 110 Independent of which view is correct, 
tippee trading is ordinarily not the subject of regulation 
. l d 111 in New Zea an at present. 
. 5 7. 
VI ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF REGULATION 
As mentioned earlier, virtually every other common law 
country has comprehensive anti-insider trading legislation 
backed up by a statutory enforcement body. These, and the 
other regulatory methods used will now be examined with a view 
to determining how effective they are in achieving ~he goals of 
the regulation of a securities market as established in the 
earlier part of this paper, at what cost these objectives are 
achieved, and how applicable these methods are to New Zealand. 
When examining the various regulatory possibilities it is 
useful to have in mind some of the parameters. Some of the 
structural parameters are: who is an insider? when must he 
report? when does liability arise? how may liability be 
enforced? how may liability be measured? what defences to 
liability are there? 
58. 
VII UNITED STATES 
The regulation of the securities mark€t in general, and 
insider trading in particular, in the United States is the most 
comprehensive and most established of all conunon law countries. 
The regulation takes the primary form of legislative and conunon 
law sanctions, and comprehensive disclosure requirements. On a 
secondary level are the informal regulatory measures of the 
New York Stock Exchange and the interplay of business ethics. 
Regulation of insider trading began with the enactment of 
the Securities Exchange Act 1934 (the ~ct')in the wake of the 
Wall Street stock market collapses. This Act provided for 
f 11 d . 1 f . f . 112 . d d th ' ' t u er isc osure o in ormation, intro uce e snor -
saving profits' rule' 113 and set up an administrative and 
regulatory body, the Securities and Exchange Conunission (S.E.C.). 
The SEC was set up with semi-legislative powers to supervise and 
regulate the securities market. 
A. Disclosure 
Under section 16(a) of the Act, every director, 114 
senior officer of a company with a registered equity sec-
urity,115 and all persons who are directly or indirectly the 
beneficial owner of more than ten per cent of any class of 
equity security, come within the general class of insiders 
who must make disclosures~ 1 ~6 .. These insiders are under an .~·. ,,,. ' . .... 
initial obligation to make a statement of their shareholding . ~, ~ 
in the corporation and ai:} orig_o/ng . obligation to report · all 
changes in their beneficial ownership to the SEC within ten 
days. These reports are the; ·~~~l~sh~d monthly. In this 
way it can be seen whether insiders are trading or not - the 
. . .. ~ ' ;. 
first step in the detectio'h ·6f insider trading. It also has 
a deterrent effect in that some of these insiders will be 
discouraged from trading by the prospect of their revelation 
~~ 
by publication. 
This section, along with the other disclosure 
provisions in the Act, has meant that there has been a 
59. 
substantial expansion in the amount of information availarrle. 
It may be said that a major achievement of the SEC has been 
the expansion of regulations for the gathering, preparation 
and dissemination of material disclosures concerning public 
companies so as to enable the formulation of an informed 
analysis of the value of the securities of publicly-listed 
companies. This great expansion in the amount of inform-
ation available has fostered the professions of market 
analysts, investment advisors and the like who, on the basis 
of the information required to be disclosed, make judgments 
as the value of securities. It has been estimated that there 
are now over 14000 analysts. This has meant that security 
prices react quickly to reflect a broad set of information~
17 
But it has also meant that there is just too much information 
available for individual private investors to absorb them-
selves. It leads one to seriously question whether the 
proliferation of vast amounts of data is really going to 
equalise the bargaining positions of individual investors 
who do not have the analytical skills to transform that 
information into a meaningful investment judgment. This 
raises the question whether the disclosure must be made in 
a 'digestible' form. From the standpoints of both market 
equity and market efficiency it is suggested that it must 
be.118 
One of the problems of the disclosure provisions of 
the Securities Exchange .AC:"t ··1s· 
0
"th~t· because they require 
the financial and other repoi~s. ~ith respec£ t~ ea~nings, 
assets and other material information to be filed only at 
the close of particular periods .and. permit these reports 
to be made a considet'able time after the close of . such 
periods, the information ~9rttained in these reports always 
lags behind significant new information which has developed 
in the interim. Thus, the essential requirement for 
disclosure of information of a short-term nature, namely 
speed, is missing from the provisions of the Act. As a 
consequence, gaps may exist in the reporting o; develop~ents 
which may affect transactions in,and values of,securities 
119 on the exchange. 
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In response to this the New York Stock Exchange and 
others have included specific provisions relating to 
prompt disclosures of important types of information in 
their listing requirements. 
B. Legislation 
The most significant direct prohibition of insider 
trading by the Legislature is contained in section 16(b) 
of the Act. This provides for corporate recovery of 
'short-swing' profits from insiders in companies registered 
under section 12 of the Act. Insiders here are the same 
as those required to file reports under section 16(a). 
The effect of the section is that all profits made by some-
one within the relatively narrow class of insiders, where 
the trading (buying and selling or vice versa) has taken 
place within a period of six months, can be recovered by the 
company. The action may be brought by the issuer of the 
relevant securities or by a shareholder on behalf of the 
company. The liability is imposed irrespective of whether 
the trader actually traded on inside information or not. 
The trading period of less than six months is arbitrary and 
fixed. If the insider trades on insicie information with 
a period of six months and one day separating the buying 
and selling, then he will not be required to disgorge his 
profits under section 16(b). The rationale behind the 
'short-swing profits' rule~is . that· most inside trading occurs 
; . 
on considerations of a short-~erm nature, that -:il.etection of 
insider trading, especially in stock exchange transactions, 
is very difficult and even if defected, there are difficult 
problems of proof, so that the best way to prevent insider 
trading is to take the profit out of all trading by insiders 
. •·j ~ t ;, 
when they trade in the - short-term. 
The rule may be criticised on a number of group.ds. First, 
the definition of insider used is narrow. It does not 
include all those who owe a fiduciary duty to the company 
such as professional advisers. Nor does it include insiders 
of one company who use inside information to buy shares in 
another company. Secondly, it takes no account of the 
c. 
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motives of the insider for dealing. The innocent are 
caught to prevent the guilty going free. The validity 
o~ this approach would depend on one's view of the 
seriousness of the insider trading problem, but it is 
suggested that the problem would have to be very serious 
to warrant such a measure. Thirdly, the insider is only 
made to account for any profit he makes. If he does not 
realise the profit within six months, or market conditions 
change to cancel out his gain, then nothing is recoverable. 
On this basis it seems that the insider will not lose if he 
trades and 'takes his chances'. If this is true, then the 
provision is not fulfilling its purpose of stopping insider 
trading. Fouithly, the rule does not provide any direct 
benefit to the individual shareholder who traded with the 
insider. Therefore, there is no real incentive for a 
shareholder to bring an action. 
In practice the rule has been superceded by other 
anti-insider trading measures which will be discussed below. 
The rule has not been followed in any o·ther country. It 
.arose out of the Wall Street collapses when corruption in 
the market place was felt to be rampant and strong measures 
were seen to be needed. It may not be appropriate to the 
quieter and more sophisticated market of today. 
SEC Control and Civil Liability 
• l, C ;· ; • • • • • • 
The SEC has developed a number of rules u~der its 
regulation-making power. The most important rule reliting 
to insider trading is Rule 10 b-s.~
20 , The Rule says 
• - I 
~ "It shall be unlawful for any p~rson, directly 
or indirectly, by use of any means of instru-
•. , :: f • 
mentality of inteistate commerce, or of the 
mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange \ ... 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice 
to defraud, 
(2) to make any untrue statement of a ·m~terial · 
fact or to omit to state a materi2l fact necessary 
-.) 
D. 
E. 
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in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course 
of business which operates or would operate as 
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security~' 
(emphasis added) 
Although it was not originally designed to deal with 
the insider trading problem, Rule 10 b-5 is now the major 
source of civil liability to other shareholders. 
Common Law Liability to the other Party 
For a period after the Act was passed, the courts 
restricted the scope of the director's duty to a fiduciary 
duty owed to the company. If he used information received 
as a result of his insider capacity for personal profit) 
121 
he was obliged to disgo-rge his gains to the company. 
(The so-called 'majority' rule). A number of exceptions 
had become accepted where a special relationship could be 
said to exist between the director of a corporation and an 
individual stockholder so that the individual could bring 
an action in his own right.
122 (The 'special circumstances' 
rule). In ·some States, the courts have upheld a general 
duty owed by directors tq ~.in9i_v;i.q1,1p.l shareholders. 
123 
However, no cqurt has upheld a duty to disclose information 
- -f'. 
when the transaction is on the stock exchange. In 
addition, only existing shareholders who sell to insiders 
are protected. 
. ' 
Extension of Civil Liabili·Ey' under Rule 10 b-5 - how 
the law has developed 
The Rule was found to give rise to a private ~ight 
of action; the disregard of the corrunand of a statute was 
f 1 t d t t 124 P . l seen as a wrong u ac an a or . regressive y 
h d d f d 1
. 125 
t e rule has been exten e to face-to- ace ea ings 
d t t k h t t
. 126 
an o s oc exc ange ransac ions. 
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1. Who is an insider 
The rule does not use the word 'insider'. Instead 
it uses 'any person'. This has been held to extend 
beyond the definition provided in section 16 of officers, 
directors and major shareholders to include brokers, 
geologists, electrical engineers, attorneys and tippees~
27
1 
The obligation to disclose rests on two principal 
elements:
128 
"[F)irst, the existence of a relationship 
giving access, directly or indirectly, to 
information intended to be available only 
for a corporate purpose and not for the 
personal benefit .of anyone and second, the 
inherent unfairness involved where a party 
takes advantage of such information knowing 
it is unavailable to those with whom he is 
dealing." 
In the case of tippees, it is unclear whether the 
liability is 'strict' or whether the tippee must have 
acted with actual or constructive knowledge that the 
material information was undisclosed. It has been 
suggested that a tippee having inside information has 
a duty to the general public rather than a fiduciary 
h . h ) 1
29 . 
duty to the company (as t e tipper as . On this 
basis his means of obtaining the inside information is 
irrelevant provided it ca~ .be . shown that he knew or i . 
should have known that his source of information was 
the company. If this is accepted, it would consider-
ably widen the class of insid~~s caught by the rule. 
. 1 
2. When does liability arise 
. ... : l . 
However up until very recently, the applicat ion 
of rule 10 b-5 has been restricted solely to the use by 
insiders of material undisclosed corporate information 
- 130 
relating to their own company and its shareholders. 
Moreover, the duty to disclose (or abstain) arises only 
where there is a specific fiduciary or confidential 
relationship derived from such common law concepts as 
64. 
trusteeship or agency, between the specific purchaser 
and the specific seller of the securities. In the 
131 recent case of Chiarella v. United States, Chiarella 
was employed by a financial printer regularly engaged 
in the printing of literature with respect to proposed 
tender offers. The literature, when submitted to 
printers, usually used code names to hide the identity 
of the offerer and offeree. Chiarella guessed the 
names of the companies and, without public disclosure 
of his conclusions, purchased the securities of several 
tender companies. Later, after the ender offers were 
publicly announced, he sold the securities at an 
aggregate profit of approximately $30000. The majority 
of the Supreme Court upheld the above cdnclusion that 
a duty to disclose or abstain from trading arises only 
where there is a special confidential or fiduciary 
relationship. However, the court did not decide the 
question whether rule 10 b-5 is violated when the 
conduct alleged constitutes a fraud upon the clients of 
the trader's employer but when no duty is owed to those 
with whom the trader deals. In a subsequent case it 
was held that such conduct does constitute a breach of 
th f "d · d · 132 h h ld th t th ose i uciary uties. It wast en e a e 
rule was satisfied because it was a "fraud in connection 
. h h h 1 f · 11133 · wit t e pure ase or sa e o any security. So it 
may now be said that providing the insider breaches 
his fiduciary duty tol-'hls -~"w~-·company, he is liable . 
under rule 10 6-5 if he trades in the sec;rities of 
134 , another company. This~ it is submitted, in effect 
does away with the constraints -of having to show some 
kind of special or fiduciary ~elationship. 
The SEC has responded to Chiarella by adopting 
rule 14 e-3, made under section 14(e) of the Act. 
The rule prohibits trading while in possessiorr of 
material nonpublic information relating to a tender 
offer. The exact ambit of this rule is unclear and 
must await further judicial consideration, but it 
' illustrates the strength of control which the SEC 
exercises over the securities market. · 
. 65. 
3. What is material information 
It has been said that rule 10 b-5 is 135 
" ... based on the justifiable expectation 
of the securities market place that all 
investors trading on impersonal exchanges 
have relatively equal access to material 
information." 
It is clear that mere familiarity with the 
corporation's operations or information resulting from 
superior personal powers of analysis, do not require _ 
disclosure under the rule. Nor does trading on market 
rumours, provided that the outsider is without specific 
information that the rumour is derived from the company 
itself or other inside sources and without reason to 
believe that the rumoured information is confidential 
. 136 · in any way. However these cases where investors, 
who are in a better position than the rest of the market, 
are allowed to trade, probably constitute exceptions 
to the general rule. The SEC and the courts have 
developed relatively strict tests to decide whether 
a disclose or abstain duty should be imposed. For 
instance, the Supreme Court in Texas Gulf Sulphur 
rejected the test of the Court of Appeals below that 
the information must be "reasonably certain to have a 
substantial effect on the market price" and held that 
the correct test was that "which in reasonable and -, ... I. 0 00 • 0 0 
objective contemplation might affect the value of the 
t • I t k . ', • 11 13 7 ;: th corpora ions s oc or securities However, e 
overall effect of recent authorities has been said to 
. d' t th t . f . t b. 138 in ica e a in ormation mus e f 
"factual, corr~ct, specific and material,. 
must have a high probability of occurrence, 
and must be of such a nature that if disclosed, 
it would have a significant effect upon prices." 
.... . 
Whilst the courts have not defined what constitutes 
material information with any particularity, the New 
York Stock Exchange has provided the following 
definition: 139 \ 
.,,6 
"Negotiations related to acquisitions and 
66. 
mergers, stock splits, the making of 
arrangements preparatory to an exchange 
or tender offer, changes in dividend rates 
o~ earnings, calls for redemption, new contracts, 
procedures or discoveries." 
F. Analysis of Provisions 
The courts have developed a reasonably comprehensive defin-
ition of msider'. Therefore on the face of it, it appears that 
the United States system of regulation very much favours 
the principle of disclose or abstain to the exclusion 
of market efficiency. This description is backed up 
by the willingn~ss of the courts to relax the formal 
requirements of reliance, causation, privity and subjective 
intention. It appears that the all-embracing concern 
of the SEC and the courts is to stamp out insider trading. 
The law has developed in a somewhat piecemeal fashion with 
uncertainty and inconsistency in the various court decisions 
as to the elements necessary for liability. One of the 
effects of this has been that flexibility has been maintained, 
which has discouraged the dishonest from inventing ways to 
get around the provisions. One other deterrent is the 
prospect of criminal prosecution under section 32(a) of the 
Act. Whilst this has been used sparingly, it may have had 
a deterrent effect. The preference has been to rely on 
civil actions with their lower standard of proof . 
• ~ a • • 
: ·, ..qi - ":;:. 
In summary, the expansive disclosure provisions have 
' provided a feast of information, not always in a digestible 
form. The reporting requirements have substantially added 
to the paper work burden of investors. The SEC has been 
zealous in its pursuit of e·qual access to material 
information, perhaps to the exclusion of other considerations. 
A good example of this is In the Matter of Raymond L. Dirki140 
which involved an alleged violation of rule 10 b-S~by an 
investment advisor. He induced others to sell securitie s 
of a company based on information which he had irrparted to them 
without disclosing this information publicly. This 
information concerned a vast insurance fraud in the company 
(, ,1 
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which two former employees had uncovered and passed on to 
Dirks. Dirks put this information to the president of the 
company who categorically denied the ~llegations of fraud. 
The former employees informed various government agencies of 
their suspicions, but they did not take any action. The 
sellers sold substantial blocks of shares prior to trading 
being suspended and a Petition for Reorganisatlon being 
filed. The SEC asserted that Dirks and the sellers 
(two investment companies) were tippees who had taken 
advantage of inside information, and as such, were in breach 
of their fiduciary duties. Dirks was originally suspended 
from trading for sixty days but, on appeal, this was reduced 
to a censure. Yet it is difficult to see how Dirks acted 
improperly. To disclose the information publicly would 
have invited a defamation suit since the company president 
had denied the allegation of fraud. To refrain from doing 
anything would have enabled the company to continue its 
massive fraud. To inform the authorities would have 
accomplished little as this had already been tried by the 
former employees _to no avail. 
The Dirks case shows that it is possible for the 
enforcement body to get carried away with its goal of 
equality of access to information so as to blind itself 
to other considerations, particularly those of a non-
legal nature. 
- i.~- ,· . .. ·: - . - .-
Section 16(b) and the New York Stock Exchange listing 
requirements and informal control over its members, complete 
the comprehensive regulation of insider trading in the 
United States. Section 16(b) providws 'windfall' benefits 
to the company and takes a~ay , the profits of a narrowly 
defined class of insiders, even if they are not actually 
exploiting inside information. This is justified on the 
basis that insider trading is a very serious problem. It is 
difficult to estimate the practical effectiveness of the 
present regulatory set-up in the United States. However 
the sheer size of the markets and the distance between 
markets probably justify a greater degree of regulation 
than would be necessary in New Zealand. 
68. 
VIII CANADA 
The United States regulatory measures were examined at 
some length, partly because they constitute the most compre-
hensive regulatory set-up in the world, but also because they 
form the foundation for most other regimes' anti-insider trading 
provisions. Canada is one such case. 
A. Initial Regulation 
Insider trading regulation in Canada has, like 
Australia, tended to develop on a region by region basis. 
The leading province in terms of innovation has been Ontario, 
and it is that province that this paper will focus on. 
Insider trading first became subject to statutory regulation 
in Ontario in 1966 following recommendations by the 
Kimber Committee.
141 This reflected growing dissatisfact-
ion with the common law control of insider trading, 
t . 1 1 th 1 . . 1 · h 
14 2 h par icu ar y e rue in Perciva v. Wrig t. Te 
legislature utilised the twin techniques of an obligati~n 
to report, and liability for the misuse of information.
143 
The obligation to report arose whenever the insider traded 
in his corporation's securities, but liability was only 
imposed when it could be shown that the insider had made 
use of specific confidential information. 
The definition of 'insider' used was similar to that 
contained in section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 
' . 
(US): directors, senior officers and shareholders who had .,. 
over ten per cent of the voting shares. In· addition it 
included inter-corporate holdings. This extended the 
definition of insider in three ways. First, it deemed 
directors and senior officers of corporations that were 
themselves insiders of an issuer corporation to be insiders 
f th . t. 144 dl t. o e issuer corpora ion. Secon y, a corpora ion 
was deemed to own beneficially securities owned by its 
affiliates.
145 Thirdly, a person was deemed to owh bene-
ficially securities owned beneficially by a corporation 
controlled by him or by an affiliate of such corporation:
46 
This definition, whilst it was wider than section 16 
of the U.S. Act, was narrower than that developed by the 
,. ,, 
courts with respect to rule 10 b-5. It did not include 
69. 
professional advisers, junior officers or tippees. 
Nor did it include insiders who dealt in the securities 
of a corporation in which they had no interest. As such, 
the definition aimed to produce certainty and precision 
rather than comprehensiveness. 
As with the U.S. Act, the insider was under an 
obligation to file a report when he first became an 
insider and thereafter whenever be traded.
147 This 
report was to be filed with the Securities Commission 
d t b · 1 bl f bl. . t. 
148 thl an was o e avai a e or pu ic inspec ion. Mon y 
summaries were published by the Commission, and also by 
some financial newspapers. However the penalty for non-
compliance of $1000 seemed insufficient and there was 
evidence to suggest that there was a substantial degree 
of non-compliance.
149 It was hoped that the wide 
publicity which attached to the disclosures made by the 
admittedly narrow class of insiders would deter them from 
trading in circumstances where it might seem that they 
. . . d . f t. 150 were using insi e in orma ion. 
In contrast with the much wider-reaching provisions 
relating to disclosure, the liability provisions only came 
into play when use was made of 'specific confidential 
information' by an insider to the detriment of the other 
party in a securities transaction.
151 The definition of 
insider was extended, based on -the broad notion that those 
with whom the insider had close contacts in business (for 
example companies), or in private life (for example 
relatives) would be likely to be privy to the same 
confidential information as the insider himself.
152 
Although this extended the ~scope of the definition of 
'insider', it did not include tippees, professionals or 
junior officers, and there was the difficult hurdle still 
to be overcome of proving that the information was · specific 
and confide ntial. Junior officers were exclude d b e cause it 
was thought that senior management itself would have an 
interest in ensuring that these people did not abuse their 
·, 
position and the possibility of dismissal would be sufficient 
( ,,1 1 
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153 deterrent. Similarly it was thought that professional 
people would be subject to the control of professional 
b d
. 154 o ies. 
Other features of the liability provision were, first, 
that the information must have been such that, if generally 
known, 'might reasonably be expected to affect materially 
the value of the securities'. Secondly, the insider 
was liable to compensate the other party only for any 
'direct loss suffered'. Thirdly, a limited defence was 
given where it could be shown that the party knew or ought 
reasonably to have known the information at the time of the 
transaction . . Fourthly, the insider was also to be 
accountable to the corporation for any direct benefit or 
advantage that was received or receivable. 155 Any share-
holder of the corporation was given the right to bring an 
action requiring the Ontario Securities Corrunission to bring 
the action in the name of, and on behalf of, the corporation · 
if the corporation itself failed to do so. 156 
The provisions instituted civil liability, with the 
·possibility of double recovery by both the other party to 
the transaction, and the issuer of the securities. The 
ambit was limited to dealings in the securities of the 
corporation of the insider. However, it does not appear 
that the insider actually had to realise the benefit in 
order to be liable to the issuer. 157 Corporations who 
received information through a 'nominee' director would be 
prevented from trading because they would hold more than 
ten per cent of the securities of the issuer. This raised 
problems when such a shareholder wished to trade since it 
could reasonably be assumed that the shareholder would 
always be in possession of specific, confidential price-
sensitive information. Such a shareholder would seem to have 
had the choice of remaining 'locked in' or trading in such 
a way as to ensure a loss to itself, or having to defend 
itself in the courts if it made a profit (or caused the other 
party a direct loss). None of these choices ~ppeared · 
reasonable. Therefore, it is suggested that the information 
71. 
would have had to have been very confidential, specific 
and price-sensitive before the courts would have allowed 
an action. 
B. New Provisions 
It was in response to some of these factors and other 
difficulties, particularly the difficulties of proof in 
showing the use of specific, confidential, price-sensitive 
information, and the lack of successful prosecutions,
158 
that a revised Act was passed in 1978 and another in 1980.
159 
Corporations that have issued securities are now required, 
when a material change occurs in its affairs, to issue 
'forthwith' a press release disclosing the nature and 
160 
substance of the change. A material change is defined 
to mean a change which "would reasonably be expected to have 
a significant effect on the market price or value of any 
of the securities of the issuer 11 •
161 In addition, a report 
of the material change must be filed with the Commission 
'as soon as practicable and in any event within ten days•.
162 
An exception is allowed where disclosure would be unduly 
detrimental, in which case a report may be filed with the 
C . . . f . d . d 
16 3 dd . . · ommission in con i ence instea. In a ition, reporting 
issuers are required to provide the Commission with 
t 1 f . . 1 164 h f . t 
b 
quar er y inancia statements. T ere ore i can e 
seen that the legislature has made a real attempt to increase 
the amounts of information available to the market and thus 
to minimise the opportunities for insider trading whilst 
maximising the efficiency of the market. 
The penalties for non-compliance range from $25000 in 
the case of a company, to $2000 or one year's imprisonme nt 
. th f . d . . d l · t · 
16 5 
in e case o an in ivi ua , upon summary convic ion. 
The Commission also has the power,if it sees it as being in 
the public interest, to suspend trading in the securities 
166 
of the company. 
the problem still 
Although these sanctions are severe, 
remains of detection of breaches. There 
are many 'changes in the business or operations' of an 
issuer167 which would not be appropriate for release -
c. 
72. 
for example, a management squabble - but which would 
reasonably be expected to have a significant impact 
on the market price. The opportunity given for a 
'confidentiality' tag to be attached to the information 
would be unlikely to induce disclosure, especially when 
there is a likelihood that the tag will be taken off. 
It is also unclear when the obligation to disclose arises. 
"Reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the 
market price" may be given a subjective or objective 
interpretation. It is certainly a stricter test than the 
"unreasonable and objective contemplation might affect the 
. f . . " d . . h . d t 168 price o securities test accepte in t e Unite Sta es. 
In addition to corporate disclosure of price-sensitive 
. f t. . . d 169 d h . . 170 . d in orma ion, insi ers an t eir nominees are require 
to file a report of all transfers made by them in the 
securities of the reporting issuer. As under the previous 
legislation, the reports are published monthly in summary 
form by the Commission. 171 Thus there has been a real 
effort made to prevent insider trading by promoting greater 
disclosure of information, and to discourage insider trading 
by selecting a class of insiders who are most likely to have 
access to inside information, by exposing them to the 
Commission's and the public's scrutiny. 
Liability for Trading 
The liability provisions have also been changed by the . 
1980 Act. The principal changes are terminological. 
Liability is now imposed where a "person or company in a 
special relationship with a reporting issuer" sells or 
purchases securities of the reporting issuer "with knowl e dge 
of a material fact or material change with respect to the 
reporting .issuer that has not been generally disclosed". 
Furthermore liability is also imposed if the person or 
company communicates knowledge of that material fact or 
material change to another person or company who uses it 
11 
. . 172 
to se or purchase securities of the reporting issuer. 
Those in a special relationship include the insiders who 
are under an obligation to report their trading to the 
D. 
73. 
Commission, 173 the officers and employees of the 
reporting issuer,
176 
and those who acquire the information 
through a business or professional re+ationship with the 
reporting issuer. 177 This substantially extends the ambit 
of the liability provisions. Most importantly they now 
include all employees, professional people and other 
business people who learn of information through their 
relationship with the reporting issuer, and tippers. Yet 
there is no liability for tippees. 
A person who trades in a situation as outlined above is 
liable for damages to the other party178 and is also liable 
to account to the reporting issuer for any benefit or 
d t . d 179 h . . 1 . a van age receive . Te provisions re ating to a 
limited defence where it can be shown that the information 
was not used by the insider or that the insider reasonably 
believed that the o:..her party knew of the information, are 
retained. Also retained is the provision for the 
Securities Commission to bring an action on behalf of the 
company. 
Analysis of Provisions 
In summary, Canada has progressively extended its 
provisions relating to both disclosure and prohibition. More 
disclosure of price-sensitive information, and disclosure 
of potential insider trading transactions are the 
preventative measures. The curative measures are recovery 
of damages suffered by another party in virtually any 
situation where use is made of undisclosed price-sensitive 
information and accountability to the issuer for any profits 
made. The sanctions for failure to report are criminal, 
those for insider trading are civil. The use of civil 
liability perhaps reflects an awareness of the problems 
associated with criminal sanctions of burden of proof. 
The double recovery provisions reflect the difficulty, in 
the case of an often anonymous stock exchange transaction, 
of relying on the other party bringing an action as a curb 
to insider trading. This is particularly so when there 
are other forces D1 the market having a significant impact 
74. 
on share prices. The provision allowing the Securities 
Commission to bring an action in the company's name recog-
nises the difficulties that a minority shareholder may have 
in overcoming the 'intern~l management' rule and persuading 
the company to institute an action. In many ways the 
provisions could be described as 'catch-all' with the 
intention being to provide a remedy in all cases, even 
if the provisions are not able to be adequately policed. 
An example of this is the inclusion of tipper liability. 
In many cases, proof that the person passed on price-
sensitive information and thereby caused loss to another 
party would be very difficult. In such a case it would also 
be difficult to show that the tipper had made a gain so as to 
make him liable to account to the company. 
However, there are at least three restrictions on the 
scope of the provisions. One is that tippees who are not 
connected with an insider may trade without liability. 
Another is that the information must be shown to be expected 
to have a significant impact on market price. A third 
is that insiders will not be liable if it is shown that the 
other party knew the information or if they prove that 
they did not make use of the knowledge of the material fact. 
This prevents major shareholders becoming 'locked in' as 
they may apparently do in Australia. 180 
One question that may be posed with respect to the 
Canadian provisions is whether the problem presented by 
insider trading is so serious that it justifies imposing a 
vast paperwork burden on insiders every time they trade, 
failure to observe of which may lead them to the stigma of 
sanction under the criminal law. A further question which 
may be posed is whether the extra benefits of the extensive 
regulation in terms of its deterrent effect, outweigh the 
extra costs, so as to leave society in general, and the market 
in particular, in a better position than before. 
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IX AUSTRALIA 
A. Common Law 
B. 
The common law position in Australia is the same as in 
the United Kingdom. Up until 1961, it and self-regulation 
were the only means of control of insider trading. This 
was almost identical to the situation in New Zealand. 
Legislative Development 
The legislative developments in Australia have reflected 
an increasing specificity of control of insider trading. 
The first legislative regulation of insider trading was 
contained in the Uniform Companies Act 1961 which provided 
for the disclosure of directors' shareholdings by use of a 
· t 181 d 1· b'l't h f ff' regis er an 1a 1 1 y tote company or any o 1cer 
who by virtue of his position gained "directly or indirectly 
182 an improper advantage". 'Officer' in this context 
seemed to refer to persons who owed a fiduciary duty to 
the company. Salient points of the liability section were 
(1) that the company vis a vis the other party to the 
transaction was the party who benefitted and who in practice 
brought the action183 (2) that there were great difficulties 
of proof so that it was difficult to get prosecutions and 
its deterrent effect was therefore negligible. 
Legislation has since been passed in some States 
184 
extending the disclosure requirements by making access to 
the register easier for members of the public and by broad-
ening the types of interests which have to be notified and 
registered. 185 Substantial shareholders in listed companies 
(those whose nominal value of voting shares exceedsten per 
cent) are also required to notify the company of their 
186 interest in the company. This includes nominee share-
holdings. 
1. Scope of provisions 
In New South Wales criminal liability was 
introduced in 1975 for insiders in three types of 
76. 
situations where they are in possession of information 
which if generally available, would be likely materially 
to affect the price of securities: (1) where the 
person is 'connected with a body corporate' and deals 
187 · 
in the securities of that body corporate; (2) where 
the person is connected with a body corporate which 
is at present involved in a transaction (actual or 
expected) with a second body corporate, and the person 
uses information connected with the transaction to deal 
188 
in the securities of the second body corporate; 
(3) where a tippee trades on information received from 
either of the two above and he knows that that person 
is precluded by the above from dealing in those secur-
ities and he is either associated with or had an 
arrangement with that person for the communication of 
information with a view to one or both of them dealing 
· · t · 189 h h th 1 in securi ies. Furt ermore, t ese ree c asses 
of insider may not communicate that information to 
another person if they know that the person will make 
use of the information for dealing or procuring others 
to deai. 1
90 The three Classes of insider themselves 
may not procure others to deal either.
191 A person is 
connected with another if he is an officer, a sub-
stantial shareholder (one who owns more than ten per 
cent of the shares), occupies a position that may 
reasonably be expected to give him access to material 
price-sensitive information by reason of a professional 
or business relationship with the body corporate or by 
reason of being an officer of a substantial shareholder 
192 
where that shareholder is a body corporate. 
The effect of this seems to be that liability has 
been extended beyond those who owe a fiduciary duty 
193 
to the body corporate. However tippees are only 
194 
liable if they take part in some 'arrangement'; 
so a casual tip on the golf course would not make the 
tippee liable. Nor would it make the tippe~ liable 
unless it could be shown that he knew or ought reasonably 
have known that the information would be used to dea1.
195 
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The provisions seem to have the unfortunate 
effect of precluding some insiders (particularly 
directors) from ever dealing in their own company's 
securities. This is because they will always be in 
possession of material price-sensitive information. No 
defence is provided for showing that one did not use 
price-sensitive information. It is an irrebuttable 
presumption. This may have the effect of discouraging 
directors from having a stake in the company, or 
alternatively, discouraging major shareholders from 
taking a greater interest in the company by taking a 
seat on the board. 
The provisions make it clear that where a body 
corporate is a shareholder of another body corporate, 
and it uses its voting power to put one of its officers 
onto the board of that body corporate, then it is pre-
cluded from dealing in the securities of that body 
corporate unless that officer does not pass information 
on and that officer played no part in the decision. 
In view of the blanket prohibition on other insiders 
who deal, it seems that this is a mild provision which 
is inconsistent with the rest.
196 
2. Enforcement of provisions 
Those who contravene the above provisions are 
guilty of an indictable offence and may be liable to 
a $10000 tine or 5 years' imprisonment.
197 In addition, 
if an insider within the first two categories listed 
above, or a company who has appointed a 'nominee' 
director, trades, then they will be liable to compensate 
any other party to the transaction for any loss 
sustained by that party.
198 That loss is to be 
measured by the difference between the price paid and 
the price that would have been paid had the information 
been generally available. In addition, an insider 
will be liable to account to the body corporate, in 
whose securities he dealt, for any profit he makes.
199 
The Securities Commission may, if it considers it in the 
78. 
public interest to do so, bring an action in the name 
of, and for the benefit of, the body corporate or other 
person for recovery of a loss or -profit of the kind 
t . d b 200 men ione a ove. · 
These provisions have been re-enacted by the Federal 
Parliament in almost identical form in the Securities 
201 Industry Act 1980 (Commonwealth). One of the more 
important differences has been the inclusion of a 
defence where the insider can show that the other party 
knew or ought to have known of the information before 
t . . t th t . 20 2 1 · · en ering in o e ransaction. A genera provision 
is also contained in the Companies Act 1980 (Common-
wealth) . 203 This provides that officers and employers 
or former officers and employees, shall not make improper 
use of information acquired by virtue of their position 
to gain, directly or indirectly, an advantage for them-
selves or any other persons or cause detriment to the 
corporation. A penalty of $20000 or imprisonment for 
f . b h . . d d 204 ive years, -or ot , is provi e . 
3. Analysis of provisions 
This legislation reflects the development of the 
regulatory framework from one of common law and self 
control and minimal interference by the legislature, 
to one of all-embracing legislative intervention in both 
the disclosure and the prohibition fields. The prov-
isions reflect a move away from the notion that the duty 
is a fiduciary one that is owed to the company, to the 
notion that there is a duty not to use information 
only obtainable through one's job, which is owed to 
society (hence the criminal sanction), to the company, 
and to the individual shareholders. This reflects 
a move away from the sanctity of the company as a 
separate legal entity whose officers are responsible 
only to it and not to the individual shareholders. 205 
It also implicitly recognises that insider trading is 
a serious problem which cannot be controlled by more 
79. 
informal, less explicit means. By making the 
prohibition on trading by insiders independent of 
whether they actually use the information that they are 
· · f 2 O 6 d . d . . th in possession o, an very wi e in its scope, e 
legislature seems to have gone for a means of 'stamping 
out insider trading at all costs'. In doing this it 
does not seem to have taken full account of some of the 
other objectives of a securities market - for example, 
efficiency, provision for 'joint ventures' by equity 
participation, and provision for directors who are also 
major shareholders to enable them to change their stake 
in the company. By not admitting a defence based on 
a plea that the other party knew of the information 
(as is the case in Canada)
207 the legisiature seems 
to have rejected the notion that insider trading should 
be prevented because of the damage it causes to the 
individual other party. Rather, insider trading is 
seen as being detrimental to the whole market because 
it gives the insider a superior bargaining position 
over all other investors, not just the particular 
person with whom he deals. 
80. 
X UNITED KINGDOM 
Up until 1980 the common law and self-regulation were 
the two methods of regulating insider trading used in the 
United Kingdom. The common law position is substantially the 
·same as in New Zealand and has already been outlined. 207 
The major limitations of the common law are first, that a 
confidential relationship must be shown to exist between the 
parties (which cuts out most stock exchange transactions), 
208 and secondly, the Foss v. Harbottle rule restricts the 
ability of individual shareholders to bring a derivative 
action on behalf of the company. For these reasons, self-
regulation became the most important means of controlling 
insider trading. 
A. Self-Regulation 
In response to the takeover boom of the mid-1950s, 
pressure from the Government and the Bank of England, 
and in order to pre-empt the imposition of statutory 
regulation and a Securities Exchange Commission, the 
City institutions established the City Panel on Take-
overs and Mergers. The Panel consists of nine persons 
nominated from the various City bodies, with a small 
secretariat. This was expanded into a full-time Executive 
and an Appeals Committee was set up under a law lord chair~ 
man. The City Code on Take-overs and Mergers was 
formulated. The Code is expressed to apply primarily to 
those active in the securities industry, but also to 
"directors ... or persons who seek to gain control of public 
. d f . 1 d . 11209 . d · companies, an pro essiona a visers. It is concerne 
with public companies only. 
The Code outlines a number of General Principles and the 
Panel has subsequently issued Practice Notes to flesh out 
the detail when it is necessary. The Stock Exchange has 
also issued Rules for its members in line with the General 
Principles. One of the most important principles is 
contained in General Principle 5 of the Code : 
81. 
"It must be the object of all parties to a 
take-over or merger transaction to use every 
endeavour to prevent the creation of a false 
market in the shares of the offerer or offeree 
210 company.'' (emphasis added) 
It was thought that the problem of insider trading was 
mainly confined to trading by tippees and other persons who 
dealt on the basis of rumours, rather than trading by 
insiders. As such the problem to be addressed was one of 
security and confidentiality. The solution was seen as 
lying in fuller and faster disclosure of information, or 
temporary suspension of trading where it was evident that 
material undisclosed information was in the market. 
Emphasis was also placed on companies developing their own 
internal guidelines and procedures for their employees to 
use when handling confidential information. 
The Panel issued a Statement of Policy which mentioned 
the sanctions that it could use. These included public 
and private censure, 211 reference to the Department of Trade 
with regard to .the suitability of a person to hold a licence 
under the Prevention of Frauds (Investments) Act 1958,
213 
reference to the relevant professional body, or suspension 
or delisting by the Stock Exchange_of a quoted security. 
Many of the sanctions were of an informal nature. If the 
Panel discovered that an insider had improperly made a 
profit it would 'endorse' his gift of the profit to a 
charity. 213 The great advantages of this procedure were that . 
people were willing to provide the Panel with evidence and 
the formal procedural difficulties of a public trial could 
be dispensed with. This allowed for speedy and effective 
· action to be taken against transgressors. 
One of the criticisms of this approach was that the 
insider got a tax advantage from the gift of the profit to 
charity. Another was that when the insiders decided to 'go 
public' themselves, particularly when their companies decided 
to back them up, the effect of the Panel's censure was neg-
atived by the counter-publicity. It was also suggested 
82. 
by the Press that the Panel was not persistent enough 
in its investigations, and perhaps not prepared to attack 
~stablished 'City' people. 214 
The City Code on Take-overs and Mergers applied 
principally to take-overs. In the more general situation 
there were (and are still) other bodies which exert some 
form of regulatory control. The Stock Exchange, through 
its Quotations Department will suspend trading in the 
securities in consultation with the issuer where it suspects 
that there may be undisclosed material information about, 
or pending disclosure or clarification of such information. 
The Stock Exchange has also published a 'Model Code 
for Securities Transactions by Directors of Listed Companies' 
in October 1977. This is almost identical in its terms 
to the Guidelines put out by the Stock Exchange Association 
of New Zealand which has already been discussed. 215 The 
burden for enforcement of the Code is put on the board of 
directors as a whole. This may not be effective if the 
insider exerts so much control over the board that the 
abuse is covered up. 
Other regulatory bodies include the Law Society, the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants, the Institute of 
Management Consultants, the Issuing Houses Association and 
the Institute of Directors. These bodies exercise differing 
degrees of control over their members. Some have issued 
guidelines specifically on the question of insider trading. 
For instance the Law Society's Council has stated that it 
would be improper conduct for a solicitor to use for his 
own personal advantage or for the advantage of a client 
or his firm or to communicate any confidential information 
obtained by him or his firm in the course of his 
professional practice. 216 The Council has also stated 
that although it is not improper conduct for a solicitor/ 
-trustee to deal for his trust in the shares of a company 
for which he or his firm acts, or of which he is a director, 
83. 
a solicitor must bear in mind that a situation of 
conflict could well arise where he would be precluded 
from using information obtained in one capacity for the 
protection of beneficiaries to whom he owes a fiduciary 
duty in another. 217 Other bodies have left this unwritten 
but would still consider that a 'member guilty of insider 
trading or of the improper disclosure of confidential 
information would be regarded as a suitable subject for 
d . . l. . , 218 1sc1p inary action . 
The Institute of Directors has issued a comprehensive 
code of conduct which sets out the cardinal principles 
that a director should not trade on a short-term basis, 
should not use inside information to deal in securities 
himself or pass it on to enable another to deal in those 
securities. 219 This code has now been substantially 
revised in the light of the Companies Act 1980 (U.K.). 
The strength of pressures by their peers upon persons 
to conform t? proper ethical standards varies from one 
professional body to another. However it was thought 
by the legislature that these pressures were insufficient 
and that'legislation was needed. 
B. Legislation 
Legislation was passed in 1967 220 which provided that 
directors and .major shareholders must notify the company 
of their shareholdings and dealings. This was to be 
available to interested parties. The aim of this measure 
was to make insider trading more difficult to conceal. 
It was thought that the fact that directors could always 
be called upon to explain the timing of their transactions 
d . d . . . f. t d t t 221 once isclose would constitute a s1gn1 ican e erren . 
In 1980, after prolonged discussion, criminal liability 
for insider trading was introduced. 222 The Act establishes 
three basic rules: 223 
1) an insider with inside information may not use 
84. 
it to deal in the securities of the company 
concerned; 
2) anyone who knowingly receives inside information 
from an insider may not use it to deal; 
3) anyone with inside information may not pass it on 
to someone else to deal; nor, being in possession 
of it and without revealing that he is in possession 
of it, encourage someone to deal. 
The concept of 'insider' in the Act is encapsulated 
in the phrase "an individual who is, or at any timein the 
preceding six months has been, knowingly connected 
• h II 224 wit a company . A person is connected with a 
company if, and only if he is a director of that company 
or any company in its group, an officer, employee or 
professional advisor who is in a position where he would 
be expected to have access to confidential 'unpublished 
• • • • f . I 225 price-sensitive in ormation . 
This means th~t tippers are caught, even if the tippee 
d t h . f . 226 h 1 h oes no use t e in orrnation. T ey are a so caug t, 
even if they did not communicate the information, if they 
1 h d 1 . h . . 227 counse or procure anot er person to ea in t e securities. 
Tippees are also made liable unless they did not have 
reasonable cause to believe that the tipper was an insider 
who should not disclose such information except in 
f f h . d . 228 per ormance o is uties. 
The information must relate to specific matters 
relating to or of concern to the company (vis i vis general 
matters), and must be likely if it was generally known, 
. 11 ff h . f h · · 229 to materia y a ect t e price o t e securities. 
Therefore, a high state of knowledge must be demonstrated 
before an offence is proved. In addition, a complete 
defence is given if the insider did not 'do the particular 
thing with a view to making a profit or avoiding a loss 
( h h f h • lf h ) I 230 h' . wet er or imse or anot er person T is recognises 
. 
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that a person may have to raise money quickly to meet 
a pressing financial commitment although it is suggested 
that the person will have to demonstrate that he had no 
practicable alternative source of funds in order to avail 
himself of that defence. 
The penalty for breaking the insider dealing provision 
is up to two years' imprisonment or an unlimited fine or 
both.
231 
In addition the common law liability of a 
director being compelled to account to the company for 
profits made by the use of inside information is retained. 
One interesting aspect of the provisions is that they 
apply to dealings not only on the recognised stock market 
within Great Britain, but also tippers when the tip is 
given to someone who will deal on a non-recognised stock 
h t . d G . . 232 h. . tl exc ange ou si e reat Britain. T is is apparen y 
I intended to stop the practice of insiders dealing anonymously, jl 
using the protection of the secrecy of Swiss Bank accounts · 
afforded by Swiss law. This perhaps reflects the fact 
that the size and corrplexity of the United Kingdom securities 
market has required strict and comprehensive legislation. 
This perhaps distinguishes the United Kingdom securities 
market from the New Zealand. 
The practice in the United Kingdom since criminal 
liability was introduced has b~en that prosecutions have 
been infrequent and successful ones even more so. This 
has been partly caused by the heavier burden of proof 
in criminal cases and the requirement to prove mens rea, 
but, perhaps more importantly, it has been caused by the 
sources of information drying up. People are willing to 
come forward with information if the sanction is to give 
the guilty party's profit to charity, and to submit him 
to public censure. However, people will be much more 
reticent if the person is liable to be labelled a criminal 
and sent to prison. Employers are unwilling to admit that 
they have a criminal in their midst. It also seems u~fair 
that an insider who lets something slip at a party is liable ·1 
86. 
to be labelled a criminal, even if the tippees do not 
trade. There are some doubts as to whether the new 
233 provisions are working better than the old ones. 
However, this does not mean that some form of legislative 
intervention would not be an improvement on the previous 
system of self-regulation. It merely means that the 
introduction of criminal liability may not be an 
improvement. 
87. 
XI FUTURE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING IN NEW ZEALAND 
.Two questions may be posed concerning the need for reform 
of regulation _of insider trading in New Zealand. First, is 
the present system of control through the twin techniques of 
court-imposed fiduciary duty, and self-regulation, adequate? 
Secondly, if not, would legislation of any of the types 
implemented in other countries be applicable to New Zealand 
so as to leave the securities market in a better state than 
it is in under the present regulatory set-up? 
A. The Present System 
It is extremely difficult to say with any degree of 
certainty how much insider trading actually goes on in 
New Zealand. However, in attempting to discuss how much 
does go on, it is useful to bear in mind the various 
types of insider trading that can go on. Reference was 
made earlier to the concept of a set of concentric circles 
f . . d . h . 
234 h . 1 o insi ers centring on t e corporation. Aste circ e 
of insiders widens, the strength of the relationship between 
the insider and the corporation diminishes. Directors 
would probably be within the narrowest circle. Tippees 
within the widest. 
Taking the narrowest circle of insiders first, it would 
appear that the amount of insider trading by directors of 
public companies is probably ~egligible and almost certainly 
tolerable. Most of those interviewed were unaware of more 
than a couple of cases having occurred. In this area it 
seems that the informal sanctions of peer pressure and fear 
of loss of reputation work reasonably well. The lack of 
insider trading may also be a consequence of the large 
number of interlocking directorships in New Zealand. For 
a market containing such a large number of interlocking 
directorships to work smoothly, a high degree of mutual 
trust is required. This in turn demands high ethical 
standcrds. The smallness of the pool of managerial 
expertise resources in New Zealand means that everyone'is 
'close' to one another. This makes it very difficult 
88. 
to act unethically and not be detected. There do, 
however, appear to be cases of people trading in relations' 
names or through nominees which are not easily detectable 
under the present set-up. 
Secondly, examining the situation of major shareholders, 
similar comments apply. The real distinguishing feature 
from the ordinary director case is when the shareholder 
receives information through a 'nominee' director. It 
was suggested earlier that, in principle, such a shareholder 
should be treated in the same way as if it (or he) sat on 
the board itself (or himself). However, there seems to 
be some ambiguity as to when that shareholder is free to 
deal, or even, when the nominee' director is free to pass 
information on to that shareholder. It is clear what 
constitutes 'good' practice but it is unclear what constitutes 
'adequate' practice. A good example of what constitutes 
good practice was when the BNZ increased its shareholding 
in BNZ Finance in 1981. 235 In that case the BNZ Finance 
board comprised both BNZ 'nominees' and independent 
outsider directors. After BNZ announced that it wanted 
to increase its shareholding, the nominee directors left 
the meeting and the remaining directors decided whether to 
recommend acceptance and sought an independent valuation of 
the shares. . This was to ensure that the transaction could 
take place at 'arm's length'. 
Just what exactly constitutes the minimum standard 
of conduct in the case when the shareholder wants to change 
its holdings is unclear. What is clear is that shareholders 
who receive information through a 'nominee' director should 
not expect to change their shareholding, at least in the 
immediately foreseeable future. One managing director of 
an insurance company told the writer that if his company 
held a substantial shareholding in another company he would 
not seek to appoint a nominee to the board of that company 
if there was a prospect that his company might want to 
change its holding. If his company did appoint a director 
he would regard it, except in exceptional circumstances, as 
· 89. 
being 'locked in'. Indeed there was a recent example 
where a board of a public company refused to permit 
two major shareholders to appoint 'nominees' onto the 
board without shareholders' approval because it feared 
that the shareholders were likely to change their 
shareholding. The inference was that the shareholders 
would want to change their shareholding based on what 
they had learned through their 'nominees' 236 Some 
further controls may be required in this area. 
Thirdly, widening the circle of insiders a little 
to include employees, it is at once apparent that some 
employees are more likely to have access to price-sensitive 
information than others. First, junior employees are 
not as likely to have access to price-sensitive information. 
Secondly they are unlikely to have a sufficient overall 
picture of the corporation to be able to recognise the 
true significance of any particular piece of inside 
information they do come across. Finally, they are more 
likely to be subject to supervision from management above, 
and the sanction of instant dismissal if they are caught 
insider trading. 
Senior employees on the other hand (the distinction 
between senior and junior is arbitrary and a matter of 
degree), are more likely to have access to inside information 
and less likely to be subject to control. Some firms 
rely on 'secrecy' contracts to control these employees 
(especially accountancy firms) but the majority rely on 
ethical· standards, as manifested in the internal rules of 
the corporation. Another means of control is through the 
board's supervision of sharedealings. Unless the employee 
trades through a third party (a relation, friend or nominee) 
the particulars of the share transfers will turn up on the 
share register. The board would then be able to inquire 
into the reasons be hind the transaction if it appe are d that 
price-sensitive information might have been used. Although 
it must be conceded that it is almost impossible to f1nd 
out exactly how much insider trading of this type does go on, 
/ 
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it is suggested that in fact there are very few employees 
within any corporation who will have access to truly 
price-sensitive information. Others may hazard guesses 
but are as apt to get it wrong as they are to get it right. 
Therefore, given the lack of reported cases, it is suggested 
that insider trading by employees is not a serious problem. 
Fourthly, examining the position of lawyers, accountants, 
stock-brokers and other professional advisers, it is clear 
that although they will be likely to have access to inside 
information, they are very much bound by the ethical 
standards of their professions, much in the same way as 
directors. If professionals do trade on inside information 
and they are found out they can be disciplined by their 
professional body, and may even lose their right to practice. 
Therefore, it is suggested that such people are adequately 
controlled. 
It is sometimes suggested that stockbrokers may not be 
adequately controlled. After interviewing several brokers, 
it is the opinion of the writer that the strict disciplinary 
measures that attach if a member of a stockbroking firm is 
caught insider trading are sufficient deterrent. Where the 
argument may have a little more validity is in the area of 
tippees. Some of the brokers spoken to did not seem to have 
any compunction about passing information concerning non-
clients to their clients. This was seen as being within 
the general scope of their function as information gathe r e rs, 
collators and disseminators. The problem of tippees has 
already been discussed in some detail.
237 Applying some 
of the considerations discussed above to stockbrokers, it 
would be unreasonable every time a stockbroker came into 
possession of what appeared to be price-sensitive information, 
to expect him to desist from using that information until 
the source of it had been checked. Therefore unless the 
broker actually knows that the inside r was bre aking a 
confidence in disclosing the information there seems to be 
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nothing wrong with him advising his clients of the 
information or the implications of the information. 
It is the writer's view that unless the insider gives 
the information to the broker in confidence, the broker 
should be allowed to use the information for the benefit 
of his clients. The insider's impropriety in divulging 
the information to the broker should not affect the broker's 
propriety in using it unless there is a 'scheme' between 
the two. 
Brokers who break confidences, such as by passing on 
information learnt from one client to another, are subject 
to the same sanctions as any other profession. The 
individual concerned is liable to be disciplined by the 
firm. He is likely to be 'blackballed' by his peers. 
His firm is likely to lose accounts to those with better 
reputations. He may even be summoned to appear before 
the disciplinary committee of his professional body, i~ 
which case he may lose his right to practice. Brokers then, 
for the most part, appear to be adequately controlled. 
Fifthly, an insider may deal in securities of a 
corporation other than his own. This may come about 
where the insider's corporation is taking part in negot-
iations with another corporation, and the outcome of the 
negotiations may have an effect on the securities prices 
of both corporations. There seems to be very little 
check on this type of trading. If the insider does not 
feel that his conduct is likely to be revealed, he may be 
more willing to risk his reputation in search of profits. 
Insider trading in the securities of other corporations may 
be insufficiently controlled in terms of supervision, but 
it is suggested that if ethical standards are an adequate 
means of control in other areas, it is unlikely that insiders 
will drop their standards in this area just because the 
supervision is not so great. 
.. 
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B. The Alternatives 
There appear to be six principal modes for 
regulation: 
1) more disclosure required by the legislature and the 
stock exchange 
2) a change in the standard of conduct required by the 
stock exchange and other professional bodies 
3) a development by the courts of the concept of a 
fiduciary duty 
4) a statutory reversal of Percival v. Wright
238 to 
allow all minority shareholders to bring an action 
in the courts, either in their own right or on 
behalf of the company 
5) the establishment of a statutory regulatory body, 
such as a Securities Commission with powers of 
enforcement 
6) the introduction of criminal liability for insider 
trading. 
These modes will be discussed with reference to the 
principles of the regulation of insider trading established 
in the fjrst part of this paper and to the regulatory 
examples of the United States, Canada, Australia and the 
United Kingdom, and to the views of those who were inter-
viewed by ~he writer. 
1. Disclosure 
There are two ways in which more disclosure can 
be used to discourage insider trading. The first is 
where corporations are required to disclose more 
information to the market. The second is where 
insiders are required to disclose their securities 
deali°ngs. 
First, there are several ways of promoting 
disclosure of information. The stock exchange can 
increase the detail required to be contained in 
corporations' annual reports by changing its listing 
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requirements. It can also increase the frequency 
of reports, for instance by requiring them to be filed 
quarterly. This will reduce the opportunities for 
trading on regularly occurring price-sensitive informat-
ion. This will also promote efficiency in the market 
by ensuring that information concerning the corporation's 
present level of performance is speedily and accurately 
reflected in the security price. 
Price-sensitive inside information of an exceptional 
nature poses greater problems to a regulator seeking to 
ensure full disclosure. Information of an exceptional 
nature can occur in two ways: instantaneously or slowly 
building up over time. In the case of 'instantaneous' 
information, the corporation should be required to dis-
close it as soon as feasibly possible. If it would be 
unfair to require the corporation to publicly disclose 
the information, the corporation should at least be 
required to notify the stock exchange. The stock 
exchange could then suspend trading, if necessary, pending 
a full announcement. 
Information which is uncertain and unspecific at 
first and which becomes more price-sensitive over time 
(as the project 'firms' up and the detail is worked out), 
is much more difficult to deal with. 
the corporation's interest to disclose: 
It may not be in 
for example, 
where sensitive negotiations are in progress. It may 
also be very difficult to pinpoint exactly when the 
ob~igation to disclose would arise. Suspension of 
trading would not work so well in this case because 
the corporation is likely to want to keep the information 
confidential for quite long periods of time. If inform-
ation of ~his kind was to arise very often, the shares 
would never be traded. Therefore, there will inevitably 
be gaps in any information disclosure provisions. 
Secondly, dealing with disclosure of insider~' 
"' 
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security transactions, there is already provision 
for directors' and shareholders' (owning five per cent 
of the shares or more) beneficial and non-beneficial 
shareholdings and share transactions to be kept in a 
' t th t ' I ' 2
 3 9 h t k regis er on e corpora ions premises. Tes oc 
exchange also requires directors' shareholdings to be 
published in the Annual Report, and to be available at 
the General Meeting. It may be a useful addition to 
require relations' shareholdings and transactions to be 
filed on a register also. 
A problem may occur if the directors or relations 
trade using nominees to hide their identities. The 
listing requirements require the disclosure of nominees 
and those who are beneficially entitled to the shares. 
This does not catch those non-directors who hold less 
than five per cent of the shares who trade using 
nominees. There has also been a good deal of non-
compliance with this requirement. 
The Securities Commission has recently been looking 
t th f . 2 4 0 1 h 1 a e use o nominees. It current y as a proposa 
before the government which would make it compulsory 
for any shareholder who owns over five percent of the 
h f t d 1 h . i'nterest.
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s ares . o a company o ec are is 
Penalties for non-compliance would include civil remedies 
such as cancellation or recovery of damages, disqualif-
ication from voting, restrictions on payment of dividends 
or other benefits such as bonus shares, orders for 
forfeiture of the securities to the company, and orders 
for disposal of the securities.
242 These would be 
useful measures. However they are directed more at the 
surreptitious take-over than at the small-time insider 
trader. 
One alternative that has been used elsewhere is to 
require all those who are likely to have access to inside 
information to register their shareholdings and their 
transactions. As one would not expect these people to 
95. 
be dealing in the shares of the company on a short-
term basis, this would not impose too much of a burden 
on them. Therefore, the disincentive to trade (and 
consequent detrimental effect on market efficiency) 
would be minimal, providing they were trading for bona 
fide reasons. A practical problem might occur if 
the circle of insiders required to report was defined 
widely. For instance, if directors, major shareholders 
and senior employees of the company, its subsidiaries 
and associates were included, the number of reporters 
for a single company might run into several thousand. 
In such a situation it is unlikely that any meaningful 
check could be maintained by directors on insider 
transactions. Therefore, it is suggested that the 
definition of insider for reporting purposes must be 
a relatively narrow one. This would also be in line 
with the view expressed earlier that there are few people 
in a company who are going to be in a position, both to 
have access to inside information and to take advantage 
of it. 
Increased disclosure has the advantage of promoting 
efficiency and equity in the market at the same time. 
It brings insider trading out into the open. The 
possibility of public scrutiny has a prophylactic 
effect of discouraging insider trading. It is also 
relatively easy to implement, to enforce, and to 
supplement if necessary. For these reasons, increased 
disclosure must be the primary focus for regulators 
of insider trading. 
One possible disadvantage of increased disclosure 
of information is that there will be so much released, 
in such a disordered way, that it will be unintelligible, 
or worst still, misleading, to the ordinary investor. 
There are at least two solutions to this: first, ensure 
that disclosure conforms to a standard, understandable 
format. Secondly, promote public education concerning 
the securities market, and encourage the use of 
financial intermediaries. 
• 
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There are limits to the impact of more disclosure. 
Some information is not of a form suitable for release, 
though it is still price-sensitive. Some insiders 
will find a means of evading the disclosure provisions, 
by trading through nominees (such as friends) and hence 
will remain undetected. Therefore, some methods 
of control are needed. 
2. Stock exchange rules and guidelines 
One method of control is the development of 
something akin to the City Code on Take-overs and 
Mergers in London. A regulatory body would be set 
up with representatives from the Stock Exchange Assoc-
iation, the Institute of Directors, the Listed Companies 
Association and any other interest groups such as 
lawyers and accountants which are deemed appropriate. 
This body would have a~r of investigation similar 
to that of the stock exchange: although it has no legal 
power, it has an informal power which is recognised by 
listed companies. If a company refused to permit an 
investigation, its shares could always be de-listed. The 
body could act on complaints by _shareholders and publish 
its findings. It could, if necessary, refer the case 
to the appropriate corporation or professional body. 
Where i~ found that a profit had been made it could 
'require' the offender to make a donation to a nominated 
charity. 
This procedure has the advantages of providing a 
relatively informal means of dealing with insider traders, 
providing a detection mechanism and remedies with suffic-
ient teeth to deter most insiders, whilst not imposing 
a burd~n on the remaining bona fide traders. It has the 
disadvantage that it will not stop the determined insider 
trader. It is unlikely to prevent the 'big boys', 
who receive information through 'nominee' directors from 
trading, because they are capable of withstanding the 
sanctions. However, it is suggested that even the 'big 
boys' are jealous of their reputations and are unlikely 
• 
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to fly in the face of an informal body consisting 
of their peers. 
Before the implementation of this proposal is 
considered, it is necessary to show that the existing 
procedures have not dealt with the problem of insider 
trading adequately. Assuming that they have not, then 
a tightening of some of the stock exchange rules may be 
appropriate. The position of shareholders who receive 
information through 'nominee' directors could be explicit-
ly stated in a similar manner to the position of offerers 
and offerees in the Take-over Code. 243 If this was 
still insufficient, only then would the establishment 
of such a body as the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers 
be necessary. 
Increased scope of fiduciary duty 
At present, the courts are willing to recognise 
a fiduciary duty owed by directors to their corporations, 
but not to individual shareholders. The courts, in 
the absence of some special relationship, seem unwilling 
to recognise a fiduciary duty on the part of employe es 
or professional advisers. They also seem to be unwilling 
to recognise derivative actions by individual share-
holders. 
It is suggested that the courts, with respect to 
insider trading, should seriously consider impl ementing 
the following: (a) recognise that a wider group of 
people than merely directors are responsible for the 
management of a modern company, who should thus be 
subject to fiduciary duties; (b) allow individual 
shareholders to bring an action on behalf of the company 
when an insider trades on inside information; (c) allow 
individual shareholders to bring an action in their own 
right. 
The cause of the courts' reluctance to pursue 
these suggestions has been the predominance of the notion 
I 
I 
• 
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of the company as a separate legal entity, whose 
directors are responsible to it for its management, 
244 and to it alone. As has been noted elsewhere: 
"the increasin~ly complex transactions of the 
business and financial communities demonstrate 
the inadequacy of the traditional t~eories of 
fiduciary obligation as tests of majority share-
holder responsibility. These theories have 
failed to afford adequate protection to minority 
shareholders and particularly to those in 
closely-held corporations whose disadvantageous 
and often precarious position renders them 
particularly vulnerable to the vagaries of the 
majority." 
There seems to be: 245 
"a growing realisation that there is an inherent 
contradiction in a set of rules which require 
corporate directors to manage the corporation 
in good faith for the interest, welfare and 
advantage of the corporation, the ultimate test 
of which is the interest of the shareholders 
as a whole, and yet at the same time allows the 
directors to antagonise the shareholders individ-
ually. The fetish of a separate corporate 
entity must be removed in order to deal with the 
merits of the situation." 
These are comments with which the present writer 
respectfully agrees, but they must be applied to insider 
trading with caution. As Mahon J. said, "the 
concept of corporate management would collapse if there 
was any general rule that the directors were also the 
fiduciary . agents of the shareholders. 11246 It is 
suggested that when a director indulges in insider 
trading, he is not acting in pursuance of any corporate 
function. He is acting for his own benefit, possibly 
to the detriment of the shareholders. Therefore, in 
principle, he should on occasionsbe liable to individual 
' 
' 
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shareholders. Some judicial willingness to look 
beyond the company as a separate legal entity was 
shown by Lord Wilberforce: 247 
"The words [just and equitable] are a 
recognition of the fact that a limited 
company is more than a mere legal entity 
with a personality in law of its own: that 
there is room in company law for recognition 
of the fact that behind it, or amongst it, 
there are individuals, with rights, expectations, 
and obligations inter se which are not necessarily 
submerged in the company structure." 
Whilst extension of the fiduciary duty of directors 
to include individual shareholders provides considerable 
scope for future regulation of insider trading, part-
icularly in smaller private companies, the apparent 
reluctance of the courts to go behind the corporate 
veil means that extensive development in this area 
. l"k 1 248 is un 1 e y. 
An alternative to imposing a fiduciary obligation 
on directors to individual shareholders is to allow 
minority shareholders to bring a derivative action 
on behalf of the company. The major disadvantage of 
allowing individual shareholders to bring derivative 
actions is that the board of the company may decide, 
in a quite bona fide fashion, that it would not be in the 
company's best interests to bring an action. This may be 
becpuse of the resultant adverse publicity that such an 
action would attract, or the large cost involved in 
bringing such an action. If the minority shareholder 
were to be permitted to bring an action on the company's 
behalf it would have the effect of substituting his 
judgment for the board's judgment. In the absence 
of mala fide on the part of the board, this seems 
difficult to justify, particularly if the writer's 
previously stated opinion is accepted that inside~ trading 
is not a very serious problem in New Zealand. One less 
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severe alternative would be for the courts to 
relax the exceptions to the Foss v. Harbottle
249 rule. 
At present, before a minority shareholder can bring 
a derivative action, he must show fraud on the part 
of those in control of the company. "Control' in this 
sense has been defined narrowly to mean voting control~SO 
It is suggested that this should be extenrled to include 
'de facto' control where it can be shown that the control 
by the insider of the affairs of the company was such 
that the company was prevented from properly deciding 
whether or not to bring an action.
251 
Furthermore, it is suggested that a wider body 
of insiders should be subject to a fiduciary duty. 
Companies have, in many cases, increased in size and 
complexity to the extent that they are no longer managed 
solely by the directors. Executives play very important 
parts in the strategic management of companies. So too do 
professional advisors. Therefore, it is suggested that 
some recognition should be given of the fact that 
these people ·are performing functions akin to those 
of directors. 
Moreover, companies are more than mere legal 
entities. They have expanded in size and power 
immeasurably since they were first recognised as 
separate legal entities last century. They are 
now more responsible to society as a whole. Therefore, 
insider trading,which is potentially damaging to society 
because it undermines the confidence of those who invest 
their capital in the securities market, should be con-
trolled. The traditional theory that directors are 
controlled through being accountable at the Annual 
General Meeting is not the reality. In practice, they 
are subject to little ongoing accountability. Therefore, 
the courts have an important role to play on behalf of 
society in preventing directors from abusing their 
't' 252 posi ions. 
However, given the courts' conservative view of the 
4 . 
scope of fiduciary duties owed to individual share-
holders (as shown by the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
. C 1 M 253 ) d h ' . . in o eman v. yers , an t eir conservative view 
of when individual shareholders may bring derivative 
actions (as shown by the English Court of Appeal in 
Prudential Assurance v. Newman 254 ), there does not 
much cause for hope that the courts will see fit to 
extend the scope of fiduciary duties in the ways 
seem 
New Zealand courts are much more reluctant to adopt a 
law-making role than their American counterparts. They 
are very unlikely to develop the comprehensive civil 
liability rules as the American courts have done. Therefore, 
whilst some broadening of the concept of the fiduciary 
duty in terms of who it is owed by, and who it is owed 
to, would be welcome, any significant expansion in its 
scope by the courts would seem to be unlikely. 
Statutory introduction of civil liability 
The legislature could introduce civil liability 
along similar lines to that already introduced overseas: 
liability for damages to the other party to the trans-
action, and liability to account to the company for any 
profit gained. This legislative intervention could 
be justifiable on the ground that, since a company is a 
legal fiction which is a creature of statute, it should 
also be regulated by statute. The legislature could also 
legitimately claim to be acting on behalf of society 
because insider trading can be seen as a societal problem. 
There are a number of problems (apart from those 
already referred to in relation to fiduciary duties) 
which would have to be overcome before general liability 
to individual shareholders could be implemented. First, 
there is the very real practical problem of designing 
provisions, which are not easily avoided and thus act 
as a deterrent, yet do not place an undue burden on 
bona fide traders and thus are conducive to market 
efficiency. How wide the definition of insider should 
be is a problem that has not been satisfactorily resolved 
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by other regimes. Should it include relatives, flat-
mates, professional people, tippers and tippees as 
well as directors, senior employees and major share-
holders?255 Should it extend to subsidiary companies 
and their officers, and other companies over which an 
insider exerts a considerable influence? The elements 
of the offence must then be defined: how specific must 
the information be? How price-sensitive? From whose 
viewpoint is this to be judged? There is little 
unanimity of thought as to what constitute the proper 
answers to these questions. 
Secondly, there is the problem of detection. 
If the other party to the transaction is to be relied 
on to enforce liability there must be some way he can 
detect when the insider is trading on inside information. 
This may be possible in the more blatant cases where the 
l . d l. f f 256 b . . par 1es are ea 1ng ace-to- ace, ut it is most 
unlikely in the case of stock exchange transactioni. 
In most stock exchange transactions the outsider is 
unlikely· to even know who the other party is. Assuming 
he does, then the problem still remains of discovering 
that, the other party was dealing on inside information 
and proving this in a court: It is suggested that 
the problems of detection, particularly when the insider 
hides behind a nominee, make recovery by individual 
shareholders ineffective as a regulatory tool. 
Thirdly, before the outsider could recover he must 
have shown that the insider owed a fiduciary duty to 
him. This would seem to imply that he would have to be 
a shareholder. He would then have to show that he had 
suffered loss, and that this was caused by the insider. 
This would involve some consideration of what the position 
would have been had the insider disclosed the information. 
It would be very difficult, where a number of different 
factors are influencing the share price at any one time, 
to show how much of the change in price was due to the 
5. 
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insider's information. It is suggested that all 
these factors could be proved only in exceptional 
circumstances. Therefore, civil liability per se 
is not feasible as the primary tool for the regulation 
of insider trading. 
Self-regulation v legislation - which for New Zealand? 
None of the overseas regimes considered have 
relied solely on civil liability to regulate insider 
trading. Self-regulation has been superceded in 
each regime by criminal liability and (except in the 
United Kingdom) by civil liability and the establish-
ment of a Securities Commission. Civil liability 
provides the company and the other party with a reme dy 
(in case damage can be shown). Civil actions have 
lower burdens of proof than criminal actions. By 
providing a remedy of damages, civil liability also 
provides an inducement for detecting insider trading .. 
Criminal liability is necessary because civil 
liability, as has been shown, is inadequate as the 
sole source of control of insider trading.
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Criminal liability increases the stigma attache d to 
the insider trader. An insider, who might possibly 
be prepared to do something immoral, and pay the 
consequences if caught, might be deterred by the prospect 
of being labelled a criminal. In ~ractice, criminal 
liability nas been used sparingly, 258 and is reserved 
for use in the particularly serious cases. 
The Securities Commission is necessary as an 
overseer of the securities market. It in many cases 
replaces criminal prosecutions by bringi.'1.g an action itself, 
or on behalf of the issuer company, or by compelling 
the issuer company to bring an action (upon application 
by a minority share holder). The Commission c a n police 
the market, and inquire into any sharp, unexplained 
price changes. 
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Given that the disclosure provisions cannot 
eliminate all opportunities for insider trading, 
the choice becomes one of self-regulation or compre-
hensive statutory intervention consisting of the three 
elements just outlined. It is the writer's view that 
comprehensive legislative intervention is inappropriate 
for New Zealand at present. 
First, it is suggested that no amount of legis-
lation is going to completely eliminate insider trading. 
By formulating comprehensive provisions, one is only 
inviting the unscrupulous insider to devise means of 
defeating them - either by legal or illegal means. If 
the former, he will feel he is acting legitimately by 
observing the letter of the law. The spirit of the 
law may be lost. One of the great advantages of the 
present set-up is that the concept is clear but it has 
not been spelt out in a too comprehensive manner. 
Therefore one is invited to adhere to the spirit rather 
than the letter. 
The enforcement of the legislative provisions will, 
f ' . t b d. . d d. · · t 259 o necessi y, e 1scret1onary an 1scr1m1na ory. 
The provisions will be incapable of precise definition 
because there are so many types of corporate insiders 
and inside information. If the definition is narrower, 
the provisions will be easy to avoid. If the definition . 
is wide, the provisions will only be capable of being 
partly enforced. The Corrunission and other enforcement 
bodies will be constrained by limited resources. With 
the threat of a criminal sanction hanging over an insider, 
evidence will be difficult to procure. With the heavy 
burden of proof, successful criminal prosecutions will 
be difficult to obtain.
26° Furthermore, the cost of 
policing the provisions will be vast. Even taking 
a case to court will mean incurring expenses out of all 
' proportion to the harm done to other investors, or the 
market. If a cost/benefit analysis wer~ done, it is 
unlikely that the legislative provisions woulj be 
justified. 
• 
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There is a cost to all the 'innocent' traders 
also. Directors and other insiders may feel thatthey 
are safer not to have shares in their companies. 
This would be contrary to the present predominant 
belief that it is beneficial for directors to have an 
interest in the companies they control. In many cases 
it would be very difficult for insiders to ever trade, 
because they would always be in possession of price-
sensitive information. The 'innocent' traders would 
also have to carry a 'red tape' burden: for instance, 
having to file details of all their transactions with 
the Securities Commission. This would not seem to be 
justifiable if the enterprising scoundrels were still 
able to avoid detection. It would be imposing a burden 
for nothing. It would also be detrimental to 
market efficiency by putting an impediment in the way 
of trading. 
Secondly, an abstain or disclose duty would lead 
to inefficiency. There will always be some information 
which, because of its nature, can not or will not be 
released. Trading on this information may be the only 
way of bringing it into the market: for instance by 
allowing tippees to trade. The price to be paid for 
this increased efficiency may well be the insider's 
~rofit. This recognises that ethical conduct is not 
the sole objective of the regulator. As unpalatable 
to the legal theorist as it may be, society may well be 
better off overall with the information 'in the market' 
through insider trading than it would be with the 
information out of the market. 
T~irdly, the introduction of civil and criminal 
liability would run contrary to the present legal theory 
regarding corporations, that a director owes a duty to 
the corporation, (and in some cases to the shareholders 
as well) and other insiders only owe a duty to the 
corporation. Most of those interviewed thought that, 
at the most, a director owes a duty to the shareholders. 
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Imposition of criminal liability would mean that 
the insider would owe a duty to society, and civil 
liability would introduce a duty to the market. Whilst 
this is in line with the damage caused by insider 
trading identified earlier, it is suggested that the 
damage would have to be great to justify intervention 
on this scale. 
Fourthly, civil and criminal liability, whilst 
it has some deterrent effect, does not address the 
major problem of the regulator dealing with insider 
trading - namely, detection. It is suggested that in 
most cases the sanctions, such as loss of reputation 
and job, are sufficient, once the insider trading 
has been detected. Therefore it is difficult to see 
how the introduction of civil and criminal liability 
will add anything. A more positive approach would be 
to set up an informal self-regulatory body such as the 
City Panel. 
Finally, one is never going to eliminate completely 
inequalities of bargaining power. Therefore it is a 
matter of regulating in such a manner as to strike a 
balance between reasonable protection of the investing 
public and the imposition of a scheme that would b e 
unduly restrictive, and indeed, have a detrimental 
effect. 
• 
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XII CONCLUSION 
If the legislative reform of insider trading is to take 
place; the onus is on the legislators to show that legislation 
is going to make the securities market in particular, and society 
in general, better off. The case for more disclosure of 
corporate information and shareholdings is compelling. Whether 
this is best achieved by the pre-existing bodies within the market 
by themselves, or whether legislative intervention is required, 
is unclear. 
It is suggested that control of insider trading should 
remain with the courts and the self-regulatory bodies within 
the market. 
justified. 
Legislative intervention does not seem to be 
The smallness and closeness of the New Zealand 
securities market make the legislative schemes devised in other 
countries, inappropriate to New Zealand. The view of most of 
those interviewed was that insider trading is not a serious 
problem in New Zealand. Where some ambiguity arises, such as 
the position of major shareholders who receive price-sensitive 
information through 'nominee' directors, the bodies within the 
market (such as the Stock Exchange_ Association) can devise model 
rules of practice, which will be followed by the majority. The 
small number of scoundrels who will evade or ignore these ethical 
rules are not going to be satisfactorily dealt with by any regime. 
Therefore, the introduction of a comprehensive legislative regime 
does not seem to be justified. 
i. 
• • 
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233. See the Bing Harris Report, op.cit. n.2 at pp 30-31 
where the Chairman of the Securities Commission, who 
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Those interviewed included 
L.M. Papps: 
I.L. McKay: 
P. Stannard: 
G. Hoskins: 
D. Whale: 
J. Aburn: 
G. Valentine: 
T. Beyer: 
T. Doyle: 
B.K. Knowles: 
D. Tudhope: 
R. Bradshaw 
Lawyer, Director of 25 public companies 
(12 as Chairman), Securities Commission 
member 
Lawyer, Director 
Accountant, Professional Director, 
Securities Commission member 
Managing Director of Insurance Company 
Stockbroker 
Stockbroker, Securities Commission member 
Accountant, Chairman of Bing Harris,Vice-
President of Institute of Directors 
Chief Executive of Investment company, 
Director of Bing Harris, 'nominee' 
director of a number of firms 
former Stockbroker, full-time Securities 
Commission member 
General Manager of NZ Dairy Board, 
Director 
former Managing Director of Oil Company, 
now Professional Director 
former Accountant, now Professional 
Director 
. 
APPENDIX: QUESTIONN ~ USED 
1. CLASSIFIC~TION 
Name: 
Position that takes most of your time 
Number of directorships 
Number of Nominee or Representative directorships 
2. REPRESENTATIVE DIRECTORS 
• 
(a) What do you see as the purpose of a dir who is appointed to the board 
of a company by a major shareholder - whether the s'h be a company or 
a person? 
(b) (i) What do you see as the status of such a dir. (ii) Is he free 
to pass info on? (iii) With the consent of the bd? (iv) Does the 
type of information make any difference? - prejudicial, benefit, neither. 
(c) What about in a take-over situation? 
(d) Should the test of whether info should or should not be passed on be. 
based on whether its benefits the coy or not? 
(e) Is there any difference between a min controlling s'h and a maj 
controJ.ling s'h? 
2 • 
. 3. INSIDE TMDERS 
(a) What situations are there when the opportunity for it arises? 
(it= insider trading) 
(b) Immorality or Unfairness Aspect 
{i) is the use of info that is not generally available what is 
unfair/immoral - if so, then is coy free to use its own info 
(ii) should you be able to use someone else's info in all cases unless 
there is a negative r e ason, or, should you not be able to use it 
unless there is a positive reason? example 
(iii) does it make any diffe rence who approaches who 
(iv) does it make any diffe r e nce that the othe r p e rson would have s old 
anyway - ·is the r e any diffe r e nce be tw. SE impe rsonal, and p rivate 
dealings. 
(c) Equality of Bargaining Position/opportunity 
{i) to what extent is this an objective , is it realisable 
3. 
(ii) Where should the line be drawn 
(iii) Any difference betwe en acce ss, and analysis 
(d)" Efficiency 
(i) The Price of Securities should reflect the ir "true" price if all 
info is known: Comme nt 
(ii) It moves the price of securities in the right direction: Comment 
(iii) How important is Efficie ncy as an objective of a s e curitie s mkt. 
(e) Reward for Entre preneur 
(i) Give 3 e xa mples - s e lf-generate d, intra coy, extra coy. 
of source of info. 
(e) Personal Expe rience 
(i) What type s exist 
4. 
(ii) What could happen, what has happened. 
(iii) Current practice. 
(iv) Size of the Problem 
4. CONTROL 
(a) Comment on existing Controls - Courts - Coleman v. Myers 
fiduciary duty - position of confidence 
SEA 
how adequate 
(b) What principles should be followed - disclosure, prohibition 
(c) Need for l e gi s lation 
s. 
(i) How comprehensive 
(ii) How wide defn of insider 
(iii) How material must the info be, .what price effect 
(iv) is the "relevant" company to be limited to the coy _of the 
insider e.g. offeree . in a take-over situation. 
(y) Any diff betw SE and face-to-face dealings 
caveat emptor, fraud 
(iv) criterion/measure of liability 
- personal loss 
- Strict (bas e d on Regal) 
- implication if coys buy their own shares 
(vii) Civil or Criminal Liab 
(viii)Who should enforce 
- Company 
- Shareholders 
- Affected party 
- Securities Commission 
Police . 
6. • 
(d) Is legislation going to leave us in a better position that we are now 
(e) Is legislation capable of being adequately defined. 
(f) Is legislation going to be capable· of being enforced. 
(i) Would it act as a deterrent 
•• 7. • 
(ii) would it punish the honest 
(iii) what would its effect be on public confidence .in the market. 
• • 
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